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# **On the Possibility of Authentic Christian Spirituality in the Post-Critical Age**

by

Peter Mullen

A context statement submitted in partial fulfilment of the regulations for the degree of PhD by  
Published Works

Middlesex University  
School of Humanities and Cultural Studies

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## **On The Possibility of Authentic Christian Spirituality in the Post-Critical Age: *Abstract***

This project consists of three of my books (plus 2 chapters in another) and a summary statement on the topic entitled above. The books are: Being Saved (London, SCM 1985); Death Be Not Proud (London, Collins Fount 1989); Reason To Believe (London, Sinclair-Stevenson 1995); and the chapters appear in Anderson and Mullen ed; Faking It: The Sentimentalising of Society (London, The St Edmundsbury Press 1998).

In Being Saved I made an extended comparison between the doctrines of traditional Christianity and the psychological theory of C.G.Jung, showing how these systems can cross-reference and cross-fertilise each other; and concluding that authentic spirituality can be enriched by such a comparison, but explicitly not concluding that Christian doctrine can be reduced to Jungian terms.

In Death Be Not Proud I attempted a phenomenological study of the idea and experience of death and considered how this may be approached from the point of our awareness of the certainty of our own death and from the point of the bereaved. The book includes a sympathetic reflection on suicide and an argument for the truth of the doctrine of the resurrection to eternal life.

Reason To Believe is a book of apologetics for the principal doctrines of Christianity as found in the Apostles' Creed, an argument for traditional texts in religious education and worship and a defence of the institutional church.

In Faking It I evidenced the widespread sentimentality in much contemporary worship and religious teaching and I identified this as an example of sentimentality which, religiously applied, I identified as inauthentic spirituality.

The works show a continuity and development of thought supported by a considerable project of reading and reflection which can be traced in the notes and bibliography.

*Peter Mullen*



**On The Possibility Of Authentic Christian Spirituality**  
**In The Post-Critical Age. By: Peter Mullen**

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## Introduction

The three books and the two additional chapters here submitted are an attempt to discuss authentic spirituality in the post-critical age and I should like briefly to direct the reader's attention to the intellectual origins of the ideas which appear in my work.

Scripture and the creeds declare that the Word is made flesh, but in the 20<sup>th</sup> century the word has got about that belief in God is *passé*, that the profession of such belief is, as Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976) said and along with miracles, "Impossible in an age of electric light and the wireless"<sup>1</sup>. Several currents of thought during the last one hundred and fifty years have nurtured this presumption of atheism. The rise of historical literary and biblical criticism in such as A.Ritschl (1822-1889)<sup>2</sup>, F.C.Baur (1792-1860)<sup>3</sup> and D.F. Strauss (1804-1874)<sup>4</sup> in the 19<sup>th</sup> century seemed to many to undermine not only the historicity of the Bible but also its spiritual trustworthiness: that the one should follow from the other may be construed as an inevitable result of the empiricist view of history fostered by the Enlightenment Project.

Ritschl seemed to reduce the definition of faith to one's willingness to make value judgements, and he refused to accept the traditional Catholic teaching that Jesus is the Second Person of the Trinity<sup>5</sup>. Baur was an Hegelian who based his ideas about the development of doctrine in the early church on the notion of conflict<sup>6</sup>. Strauss denied the historicity of the supernatural events in the gospels and inscribed them to the working of a creative myth. He further criticised Schleiermacher's attempts to identify the Jesus of history with the Christ of faith<sup>7</sup>.

Of course, historical and theological scepticism had made their appearance much earlier than the 19<sup>th</sup> century. David Hume (1711-1776) wrote, "If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, let us ask, 'Does it contain any abstract reasoning



concerning quantity or number?’ No. ‘Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?’ No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion”<sup>8</sup>. The extreme empiricism of Hume’s philosophy was widely regarded as having refuted the classical arguments for the existence of God found in such as Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)<sup>9</sup>. And the classical arguments were systematically (and many thought decisively) criticised by Kant (1724-1804) in *The Critique of Pure Reason*<sup>10</sup>. Of course, religious faith did not entirely evaporate in Britain during the 19<sup>th</sup> century and there were, in the Church of England for instance, even vigorous revival movements led by both Catholic<sup>11</sup> and Evangelical<sup>12</sup> wings. And it has often been pointed out that churchgoing in that era actually increased<sup>13</sup>. But the spirit of the age was sceptical, agnostic<sup>14</sup> and humanistic, and this scepticism ran like a current through the art and culture of the period. Sometimes the pervading scepticism seemed to be a matter for regret, as for example in the works of Matthew Arnold (1822-1888)<sup>15</sup>; but other writers accepted the changed *Zeitgeist* with exuberance. Shelley (1792-1822) was a rhapsodic atheist<sup>16</sup> while Swinburne (1837-1909) exuded something like a savage enthusiasm for the cause of unbelief<sup>17</sup>. There were still others, perhaps even more interesting subjects, such as George Eliot (1819-1880) who translated Strauss’s *Leben Jesu* and rejected the forms of traditional belief but tried to preserve its emotional content as well as its practical virtue in for instance *The Choir Invisible*<sup>18</sup> - written as a reply to Auguste Comte (1798-1857) who had asked her to compose a positivist utopia<sup>19</sup>. The dominating musician of the age was Beethoven (1770-1827) whose symphonic works orchestrate the humanist and Romantic aspirations. The Third, *The Eroica* (1804) was originally composed as homage to Napoleon, the great liberator<sup>20</sup>. The Sixth, *The Pastoral* (1809) is a hymn to the natural world<sup>21</sup>. While the Ninth, *The Choral* (1817) is a celebration of joy in human love<sup>22</sup>. The antireligious spirit of the age achieved its apotheosis, so to speak, in the character and works of

Nietzsche (1844-1900) and most explicitly in his astonishing claim that God has died <sup>23</sup>. There were parallel discoveries in geology, in such as the works of Lyell (1797-1875) who, nevertheless, was no materialist <sup>24</sup> and in the evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin (1809-1882), both of which seemed to many to undermine the creation narratives in the Bible <sup>25 26</sup>. The agnostic, sceptical and humanistic temperament was not shared universally, but it must be allowed that it was prevalent. Romantics and idealists continued to claim that God and religious faith might still command the assent of their contemporaries. Coleridge (1772-1834) had read and admired Kant <sup>27</sup> and he satirised the scientists' claim that empirical evidence should be the only criterion for beliefs of any sort <sup>28</sup>. His near contemporary Kierkegaard (1813-1855) spelt out a similar message with relentless irony <sup>29</sup>. The greatest English religious apologist of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was John Henry Newman (1801-1890) who had made up his mind early that the theological struggle in his lifetime was between dogma and "liberalism" <sup>30</sup>. There were other defenders of faith <sup>31 32</sup> but the epoch was all against them

During the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the successors of Hume, the Logical Positivists of the Vienna Circle <sup>33</sup> claimed that religion is merely irrelevant in a world where all genuinely useful explanations are either mathematical or empirical <sup>34</sup>. The ubiquitous A.J.Ayer (1910-1989) declared that all propositions about God are strictly-speaking "meaningless" <sup>35</sup>. And the refined minds of the Intuitionist philosophers, the Apostles of Bloomsbury led by G.E.Moore (1873-1958), offered an account of the scope and purpose of ethics without recourse to notions of divine teleology <sup>36</sup>. Ayer himself decided that morality is entirely a matter of "emotive", subjective preferences <sup>37</sup>.

Positivistic and atheistic accounts of human origins and scope prevailed so that by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century it seemed to many that the universe and humankind's place in it were becoming fully explainable in terms which left no room for the divine Creator. At the beginning



of the 20<sup>th</sup> century even the last refuge of traditional spirituality, the mind wherein might yet lurk intimations of immortality, was invaded by psychoanalysis and all human motivation was ascribed to the unconscious mind's genius for fantasy and the displacement capacity of libidinal energy. In 1927 Freud (1856-1939) described the development of religious faith as only *The Future of An Illusion* <sup>38</sup>. The inventor of psychoanalysis went so far as to invert the traditional doctrine of creation as to suggest that it is man who makes God in man's own image <sup>39</sup>. The behaviouristic psychology of such as B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) claimed to dispense altogether with the need for mental faculties and described human conduct entirely in terms of stimulus and response <sup>40</sup>. This type of psychology was entertainingly savaged by Arthur Koestler (1905-1983) who wrote, "Now that mankind has lost its soul, gone out of its mind and seems about to lose all consciousness, what is there left for psychologists to study? Professor Skinner answers, 'Rats'" <sup>41</sup>.

The whole enterprise of scientific discovery, taken together with historical criticism, though enormously impressive, may itself be criticised for its tendency towards reductionism and as an example of what George Eliot derogated as "A lapse from the picture to the diagram" <sup>42</sup>. The various scientific and positivistic explanations *explained* well enough, but when they had done their explaining it seemed to me that they still left a whole dimension of human experience untouched; moreover that this dimension was the quintessence of what it means to be not merely a biological animal but a human being. The theory of evolution might catalogue our biological pedigree, but it is deficient when it comes to accounting for a sense of wonder and our capacity for love and loyalty, our appreciation of art, music and literature: aspects of our being which seem constitutive of what we mean by "human". And if we are only our DNA, then certain philosophical problems (of the sort described by Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and the phenomenologists) arise when we try to speak of genes making choices <sup>43</sup>.

The behaviouristic reduction of all human life to the rudimentary level of stimulus and response makes it impossible to talk about human life at all. Behaviourism describes human actions in purely physical terms so, since it will not admit such concepts as will and intention, it can speak only of reflexes, stimuli and responses. Human learning becomes a process of classical and operant conditioning in which stimuli are said to reinforce responses. More recently the scientific psychologists have refined crude Behaviourism in line with the development of the new language of computers, and now their vocabulary concerns itself with “information theory” and “modified programmes”; but, despite the refinements produced, this sort of psychology has not returned to the study of the mind or the soul.

Scientific psychologists do indeed study *something*, but this has nothing to do with what we ordinarily mean by “human beings”, what we call “people”. A psychology which does not include in its vocabulary such words as “mind”, “person” or “soul” cannot logically proceed to the use of words such as “should”, “jealous”, “grateful” or “guilty” or phrases like “My heart is in my work” and “He thinks the world of her”. But such phrases as these are constitutive of what it means to be human, and the use of them is our hallmark: <sup>44</sup> <sup>45</sup>

It seemed to me then that so much in the progress of modern understanding since the Enlightenment is dazzling in its technology and innovation, but inadequate and strangely arid in its discussion of the deepest thoughts and feelings which continue to assail our waking consciousness and invade our dreams despite the best efforts of Hume and Darwin, Freud and Professor Rudolf Carnap to liberate us from them. In George Eliot’s words again: when it comes to those things which deeply concern us, we are not willing to lapse from the picture to the diagram. Could it really be that the theological teachings which had illuminated the darkness for millennia and the spiritual insights which had so resounded in human awareness for all that time were now dead and finished - so much primitive superstition from which we have been



progressively liberated since the Enlightenment? It did not seem possible to admit this without at the same time abandoning most of those teachings and insights - to say nothing of pictures and tunes - which describe what it is to be human. But if religious and spiritual consciousness were only the future of an illusion, how to proceed?

These sceptical and agnostic influences were prominent in my own education and there was no way of escaping from them into a world of religious calm. I read Karl Barth's (1886-1968) *Romans* and I was moved and inspired by such passages as this:

"We cannot and need not ask how it is possible from our side to have peace with God, that we can be reconciled with God in spite of everything we are and do. In him it became true that in spite of ourselves we are reconciled!"<sup>46</sup>.

I read Charles Gore (1853-1932) and *Lux Mundi* <sup>47</sup>. And I even read D.R.Davies' *On To Orthodoxy* in the 1960s when to be seen with such a book was to earn the sort of disapproval from one's "liberal" associates that once upon a time might have been reserved for a schoolboy caught by his housemaster flicking through *My Life and Loves* <sup>48</sup> by Frank Harris (1856-1931). But the spirit of the age operates powerfully, and sometimes it seems all-powerfully; and there seemed to be something archaic, something that had been superseded by a vital and energetic modernity, about mainstream natural or biblical theology. I had not at that time read Eric Mascall (1905- ), so I had not come across the sort of alert criticism of theological fashion one finds in his best writing <sup>49</sup>. I had read a good deal of Chesterton (1874-1936) and his denunciations of mere modernity such as <sup>50</sup>. But in my inexperience these works too seemed as if they had been, as it were, overtaken by the rush of modern secular thought. I was not reading closely enough and consequently I was too much affected and impressed by the radical theology of the 1960s than I ought to have been.

In that same decade the most reductive criticism of religious belief seemed to come not

so much from its traditional opponents but from its own scholars and practitioners. The most influential book of popular theology in that decade was *Honest To God*<sup>51</sup> by Bishop J.A.T. Robinson (1919-1983) who not only claimed that it is our “image” of God which must go, but who seemed to dismiss the possibility of metaphysical theology, and with it the traditional understanding of transcendence altogether<sup>52</sup>. Robinson’s book was only the first wave in what became a roaring tide of churchly scepticism, the destructive force of which was revealed by both the title and substance of the Bishop’s best-selling sequel<sup>53</sup>.

Sometimes liberal theologians attempt to explain or excuse books such as *Honest To God* by the claim that they were written only for “popular” consumption. Really this is no defence, for, unfortunately words mean what they say, whether their provenance is between the covers of a ten volume *summa* or in the slender pages of a £3.99 paperback. Robinson did actually *express* those trenchant views about our image of God and about the lack of possibilities for transcendence in theology - no matter where he expressed them. It soon turned out that Robinson, accused by his opponents of being an iconoclast, was actually rather conservative when compared to some of his notable contemporaries. Paul Van Buren published *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel*<sup>54</sup>. Thomas J.J. Altizer (1927- ) seemed to go much further than Van Buren<sup>55</sup> and William Hamilton even further than Altizer<sup>56</sup>.



## **Jung and Christian Doctrine in My Book *Being Saved***

### **Argument and references for the ideas expressed in this section.**

It was then that I came across the work of C.G.Jung (1875-1961). It seemed to me that he had found a way of so rooting the Christian theological dogmas in psychological experience as to make these dogmas indubitable. I was particularly impressed by Jung's account of what he calls "the Shadow"<sup>57</sup> - for him an aspect of the personality with which each one of us is directly acquainted. The Shadow, says Jung, is our dark side. It is that part of us which we constantly strive to disown, and we do this either by outright denial or by projection: we claim that we are not as bad as our critics say we are; or else we habitually find in others precisely those faults which are our own besetting sins. How to understand this aspect, the Shadow? Jung provided an attractive cross-fertilisation of ideas: on the one hand we experience the Shadow as our own inner wickedness, and on the other hand we have an image of him in the traditional character of Satan or the Devil.

The development of the character of the Devil in the western tradition began in the Old Testament period where, for example in the Book of *Job*, Satan is something like God's counsel for the prosecution whose task it is to examine Job and find fault in him. The character, or as Jung would say, the archetype, of the Devil developed during the New Testament period and in the writings of the church fathers and the medieval theologians until as Satan he became the very personification of evil. Jung's account of the development of the Shadow is stimulating because it connects the world of theological doctrine with the inner world of psychological experience. It seemed to make sense psychologically that the character of the Devil as the Prince of Darkness would develop as a counterbalance to the historic proclamation of Jesus as the one who contained the fullness of the light of the glory of God,

the one in whom there was no sin nor any darkness to be found. Jung declared that the need for psychological equilibrium demanded that the archetypes of light and darkness should develop in this way, and his analysis was illuminating<sup>58</sup>. Theological teachings and inner psychological experiences were bound together, or one might say that spirituality and psychology were the outside and inside of the same thing.

The apocalyptic writers of biblical times created the image of the lake of fire and of the Devil and all his angels not as caricature figures from some grotesque pantomime but as externalisations of their real fears and nightmares. People who were accustomed to facing tangible fears such as starvation, plague and conquest would not have been easily frightened by pantomime demons. That creature with the fork and the tail was not whom they were afraid of. It was the other way round: the pantomime Devil was the popular artistic reproduction which they created out of their tangible fears. The medieval Christians were not frightened so much by that grotesque external image as by experienced terrors that were inescapable: the pantomime image was what they created as a means by which to objectify and so manage their fears. Of course there was, as always, a broad conceptual spectrum from the almost tangible mythology of the peasant to the refined doctrines of the theologian.

They also felt the destructive force of their own wickedness, greed, raw ambition and lust. They felt this in themselves and they also saw its expression in the world. The fear of burning everlastingly was at least partly constructed out of their personal experience of burning inwardly with corrupt desires and ambitions. The way Jung relates dogma to psychological experience is stimulating and fruitful: we look at a medieval painting of heaven and hell, say, and between them the theologised earthly landscape and we thereby learn something of our inner psychological states and impulses. Reciprocally, we can find, to use T.S.Eliot's (1888-1965) phrase, "an objective correlative"<sup>59</sup> in the painting or the piece of literature for our

inward feelings and dispositions.

Jung's work on religion is a psychological restructuring of Christian symbolism in terms of what he refers to as archetypes as he compares the traditional idea of the soul's salvation with the psychological pilgrimage towards what he calls individuation <sup>60</sup> or personal wholeness. His insights into the problem of evil are exciting, provocative and creative in the sense that they encourage the reader to think about the teachings of the faith in new and interesting ways and to make links between the external patterns of dogmas and the internal patterns of psychological states. Of course, Jung is notoriously heterodox and in an earlier age he would have been dismissed as heretical in, for instance, his suggestion that God has a "dark side" - explicitly that evil as well as good originates in the Godhead:

"Since the Apocalypse we now know again that God is not only to be loved, but also to be feared. He fills us with evil as well as with good, otherwise he would not need to be feared. This involves man in a new responsibility. He can no longer wriggle out of it on the plea of littleness and nothingness, for the dark God has slipped the atom bomb and chemical weapons into his hands and given him the power to empty out the apocalyptic vials of wrath on his fellow creatures" <sup>61</sup>.

This saying of Jung's, like so many other astonishingly vibrant and evocative passages in his work, flirts with exaggeration and is born out of a fundamental misinterpretation. It is nonsense to say that only since the Apocalypse, the Book of Revelation at the end of the Bible, has man learnt to fear God: the Old Testament Psalms and Proverbs state unequivocally that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom <sup>62</sup> and there are many verses in the Pentateuch and the Prophets<sup>63</sup> which teach a holy fear of God. Jacob in the desert cries out, "How dreadful is this place!"<sup>64</sup>. And at the burning bush Moses is commanded, "Put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground" <sup>65</sup>. These verses speak of

God's numinous presence but they do not try to teach us that God should be feared because he is evil. God is not evil, but awesome. God is to be feared because he is so much higher than man. "I am that I am" - God is God <sup>66</sup>. The Old Testament is haunted by the awesome presence of God. The New Testament and the church fathers would go even further and say that God is terrifying in his infinite goodness <sup>67</sup>. Moreover, the traditional and orthodox teaching of the church, particularly in the writings of St Augustine (354-430) and St Thomas Aquinas, is that God is not the origin of evil. Strictly speaking, evil has no being. It is only a *privatio boni* or a μη ον - a lack of good or a mere nothing <sup>68</sup>.

Jung often protests against the traditional doctrine and in effect asks how anyone could doubt the reality of evil in a century which has produced two world wars, Hiroshima and the Holocaust. But it seems to me that this protest is based on philosophical or linguistic confusion: one would hardly be so foolish as to wish to deny the *fact* of evil, but its *reality*. There is some logical backing for this distinction not only in Aristotelian discussions of what is meant by *substance* but in the analysis of negation to be found in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* where it is made plain that *no* is implied by *yes*. And yet, insists Wittgenstein, negative propositions have no reference <sup>69 70 71</sup>. Practically and ethically this means that as soon as good is defined and insisted upon in the Commandment, the character of the alternative evil is laid bare. "See I have set before thee this day good and evil (saith the Lord); therefore choose good that thou mayest live"<sup>72</sup>. The act of creation logically guarantees the possibility of evil.

Heterodox Jung may be, but he still throws a powerful light on theological categories and stimulates the reader to think about religion in a non-reductionist way. If this essay of mine is a partial intellectual autobiography - and I am not ashamed to use *partial* in both its senses - then I should like to record the immense feeling of relief and excitement on reading Jung: here



was a man of the 20<sup>th</sup> century who was prepared to discuss theological categories and doctrines in a non-reductionist way.

Having identified the Shadow, Jung digs deeper into the world of psychological archetypes and discovers the Anima <sup>73</sup>, the latent femininity in the masculine unconscious and - though he does not give anything like as much attention to this - the Animus, the latent masculinity in the feminine unconscious. He has been censured by some feminist critics <sup>74 75</sup> for what they regard as his “sexist” delineation of the human psyche and perhaps there is some justice in their case. But when all is said and done, no man (nor even woman) can argue from every perspective at once.

As in the case of the Shadow, so with the Anima Jung identifies a rich network of connections in the realms of religious doctrines and psychological contents. The objective correlative of the psychological archetype of the Anima is variously the temptress Eve, Circe the siren and *Das Ewig-Weibliche* of Goethe’s *Faust*. In her highest and purest personification she is the Blessed Virgin <sup>76</sup>.

In Jung’s categorisation the stages of the Anima are: child, temptress, wise woman and finally woman of supreme virtue. In other words, the Anima grows up. This process for Jung is psychological, but for the Christian who finds it useful it is also profoundly moral and spiritual. The archetypes of the Anima in the Christian story are the Holy Innocents, Eve the Temptress, Holy Σοφία who is ancient wisdom and the consort of God, and finally the Blessed Virgin who is Θεοτοκος, God-bearer.

The development of the archetype of the Father God, the Spirit who becomes flesh at the Incarnation, is precisely mirrored and balanced by that of the Mother Earth, the *mater*, the material which is spiritualised at the Assumption. The Earth Mother is clothed in the robe of

the Sky Father. And Mary's colour is blue. I am grateful for Professor Homan's criticism of this reflection. As he pointed out to me in conversation, the colour of the Virgin Mary's attire was red until the discovery of *lapis lazuli*. True, but she has been clothed in blue by painters since the middle ages and nine hundred years is a period long enough for the identification of a psychological archetype. Facetiously, any woman wearing a dress for nearly a millennium might well expect to be recognised in it! She is femininity perfected as Christ is perfect masculinity as well as perfect Man (*Mensch*). Heaven comes down to earth and earth is taken up into heaven. Mary is Queen of the Church which is the Bride of Christ. At the Last Day the Church ascends to meet her bridegroom, Christ, and the *Ἱερός Γάμος* - the holy wedding - takes place in the courts of heaven <sup>77</sup>. Psychologically speaking, for Jung, this holy wedding is the union of the Ego with the unconscious depths.

The fundamental archetype in what might be called the Jungian pantheon is the Self (*Selbst*), a psychological aspect not to be confused with the Ego which is merely the conscious part of the personality. The Self is the unconscious depth and foundation of the person, that to which the Ego ultimately tends and with which this unruly Ego has to forge reconciliation if individuation, the wholeness of personality, is to be achieved <sup>78</sup>. For Jung, talk of the Self is, psychologically speaking, talk about God <sup>79</sup>. As in the discussions of the Shadow and the Anima, so again in the case of the Self, the comparisons between psychological concepts and theological doctrines are creative, exciting and revelatory. Jung's description of the Self as depth reminds us of some of the most powerful spiritual motifs in the Old Testament, such as the Psalmist's "Out of the deep"<sup>80</sup>; and comparison with the theology of the New Testament recalls and illuminates the relationship between the Father and the Son <sup>81</sup>. The reconciliation between the Shadow-haunted Ego and the Self which is our depths reminds us of some of the best mystical writing in the Christian tradition and particularly of Meister Eckhardt (c1260-

1327)<sup>82</sup> and St John of the Cross (c1505-1560)<sup>83</sup>.

Among modern theologians to exploit creatively the concept of depth is Paul Tillich (1886-1965)<sup>84</sup>. These sorts of connections make for a most productive cross-fertilisation of the images and motifs of traditional spirituality. Jung thus presents refreshing insights into spirituality, and his work encourages new departures for theological concept-formation. To read Jung alongside the great doctrines of Christianity was for me something like the creation of a wonderful series of *Gestalts*: you read Jung and you read the Creed and suddenly you find you are in possession of more than your original understanding of either Jung or the Creed; strike the anvil of analytical psychology within sight of the anvil of Christian spirituality, and the spark flies between them to produce fresh illumination. Of course, a less excitable and more knowledgeable student of spirituality than the present writer might say with some justification that there is nothing new in this. He might point to St Augustine, for example, or Mother Julian (c1342-1413) who possessed many insights into God's femininity<sup>85</sup> and remind us that the great spiritual teacher is always and necessarily also a great psychologist. Still, I came across Jung's work at a time when so much of what I was reading from the pens of philosophers, scientists, historians and even theologians themselves was arid and reductionist, and I could not help being relieved to discover at least one writer among contemporaries and the recent past who was clearly intelligent and imaginative and who yet did not eat every day at the Nothing-buttery.

The most direct way in which to elucidate Jung's method is not merely to discuss him but to try to give an example in summary form of his likely approach to a particular psychological-spiritual episode. St Matthew's account of Christ's temptations in the wilderness provides a good opportunity for this. It opens startlingly: "Then was Jesus led up of the Spirit to be tempted of the Devil"<sup>86</sup>. Contemporary religious thought tends towards one of two

extreme opinions about the Devil: either that he is an antique fancy (various liberal theologians) or that he is the personification of supernatural evil who frequently interferes in the lives of saints (sundry revivalists and charismatics). Generally the Bible takes neither view but insists instead that the Devil or Satan is an important part of the divine creation <sup>87</sup>.

In *The Book of Job* Satan is “one of the sons of God” and in St Matthew’s gospel he is an accomplice of the Spirit - for the gospel does not record that Jesus was lured into the wilderness by diabolical cunning, nor did he merely wander there aimlessly only to be picked off by the wily old snake; but the Son of God was led into confrontation with the Devil by the Spirit of God himself <sup>88</sup>.

This story concerns the complete integrity of Jesus himself. In psychological terms, the event immediately preceding the temptations (his baptism and annunciation in the Jordan) is a unifying and integrating sign. Jesus is told who he is and his vocation is dramatically announced in the words, “This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased” <sup>89</sup>. Jung would point out that this is a typical (archetypical) example of the ancient motif according to which countless heroes, from Ulysses to Balder, from Tamino to Siegfried, bear witness to a period of severe testing which occurs soon after the hero’s initial call. Jung would also insist that Jesus the man really did suffer temptation and that this means there was a real chance that he might give in <sup>90</sup>. Jung would identify the temptations of Christ as an example of every man’s experience of the personal, psychological encounter between the Ego and the Shadow - an encounter which is absolutely necessary if spiritual development/individuation is to proceed. For Jung, there were not two characters involved in the temptations, but two psychological aspects of the one Jesus <sup>91</sup>.

All this is anathema to orthodoxy which sees Jesus not only as sinless but incapable of sin. But Jung would insist that real temptation - the encounter between the Ego and the

Shadow - is the fate of every man; and so a Jesus who was never in danger of falling from grace could not possibly be genuinely human and a pattern for our redemption.

If, when we look at the story of the temptations, we see Satan, the Shadow, as sharing in the divine sonship, we can appreciate all the better his purpose which is to provide stimulation and the opportunity for virtue. It is the Devil who asks the questions, who, as it were, provides the moral agenda which, through the process of long argument, Jesus subtly redirects in favour of goodness. Jesus acknowledges the existence of the Shadow and by accommodating its energies and transforming its intention makes it a part of his integrated personality. The church, by contrast, has usually rejected this interpretation and so, Jung would say, has failed to integrate the Shadow - a failure which has led to an enormous problem in the form of a separated, and quite independent personality called the Devil <sup>92</sup> who is supernaturally evil and who, thus unintegrated, is free to wreak moral and spiritual destruction until the last battle at the end of time when at last he will be cast into the bottomless pit <sup>93</sup>.

The corollary of the separated and wholly evil Satan is a cosmic Christ who more closely resembles the aloof Gnostic Redeemer than the Suffering Servant <sup>94</sup> (acquainted with grief) or a genuine Son of Man. The psychological parallel of such a Christological interpretation points to ~~as~~ everyman unreconciled, unindividuated and incomplete because he has refused to acknowledge and integrate his own dark side. How, asks Jung, can a man, let alone a Christ, be a genuine moral agent or possess true self-understanding if he will not recognise his Shadow and admit his faults, but who instead projects his faults (casts his Shadow) on to others? The invention of the separated character of the Devil is, for Jung, the biggest example of projection in the whole epoch and the fatal mistake of Christian orthodoxy. Jung's is at any rate an intelligent interpretation of the Christian aeon.

The Jungian interpretation is however theory-laden, jargon-ridden and eccentric and it



easily declines into self-conscious affectation (as did Jung himself in his middle age) and its devotees assume some of the undesirable characteristics of a cult dismissive of all alternative interpretations. I have attended the Jungian conferences of the Guild of Pastoral Psychology and observed a great deal of Shadow-boxing and Anima-hunting in the bars and along the corridors at night. Many of these conferences radiated with the same uncritical enthusiasm as gatherings of fundamentalist Christians: the evangelical congress, one might say, only without the teetotalism. Menopausal Pre-Raphaelites rattling their beads, their long yellow hair dangling over the swamp. The practice of Jungian psychology easily degenerates into the sanctimonious Me-ism of the New Age in which devotees never cease to be alert to every twitch and twang of their psychological innards. Nevertheless, I admired the honesty of Jung himself who at least scorned the unexamined Pelagianism of our age, and especially of the liberal theologians and the synods with their utopian schemes, and really accepted the fact of evil <sup>95 96</sup>.

When I wrote *Being Saved* I was writing very much under the Jungian spell, an enchantment which has loosened its grip with the passage of time and the unavoidable experience of having fresh thoughts. Still, I would insist that there are intimations of spirituality in Jung which are richer and more creative than much of what has passed for Christian spirituality in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Perhaps if I had read Newman more carefully before my encounter with Jung I might not have been so beguiled <sup>97</sup>.

...Or if I had read the sermons of Lancelot Andrewes (c1555-1626) <sup>98</sup> or William Law (1686-1761) <sup>99</sup>. Why not? I knew they were spiritual geniuses, for I had been told as much by T.S.Eliot <sup>100</sup>. But I was as arrogant as I was ignorant and I regarded these luminaries as somehow restricted to their historical period. Another fulfilment, one might say, of Rudolf Bultmann's bogus prophecy about the impossibility of believing in miracles in the age of electric light and the wireless. I desperately needed a contemporary to make sense.

## **What Is Original about *Being Saved*?**

From the 1950s onwards, and particularly in the numerous Jungian studies by the Guild of Pastoral Psychology, Jung's opinions tended to get presented as if they were almost a religious faith in themselves, or at least a high-class substitute for faith; in effect a sort of modern gnosis. Jungians seemed to believe that an understanding of the religious archetypes - Shadow, Anima and Self - removed the necessity for the acceptance of the traditional categories of transcendence. It was not necessary to believe in God once one had grasped the idea of the archetype of the Self. Moreover, Jung himself, in a reversal of the Kantian dictum, might be said to have removed faith in order to make way for knowledge. When, for example, he was interviewed in 1960 (the year before he died), Jung was asked, "Do you believe in God?" And he replied, "I don't have to believe. I *know*" <sup>101</sup>.

Jung's teachings represented a psychologising of religious categories and there were many people who felt relieved by this operation of the need to accept the reality of the existence of the transcendent God and substituted for it the *concept* of depth in the human psyche. Jung complained relentlessly that he was much misunderstood: he did not mean to render religious contents as subjective; on the contrary, he constantly claimed that psychological events are really real. But in my view he came close to saying that these events are the only spiritual reality.

Whereas in *Being Saved* I tried to develop the idea that psychology and religion are, as it were, the inside and the outside of the same thing. Using this suspicion as a working hypothesis, I compared the Jungian teachings concerning the so called archetypes of the collective unconscious with the traditional credal articles of the Christian faith. Certainly, I concluded, Jung's thoughts provide a hugely creative and inspirational introduction to the faith,

but they do not exhaust its categories or reduce its categories to those of depth psychology - even if Jung thought they did exactly that. After the publication of *Being Saved* I was invited to give a lecture at York Minster in which I would summarise the book. I was very careful to say that I did not regard Jungian psychology as a substitute for Christian doctrines but, as I have repeated here, a scheme which throws light on those doctrines. After the lecture, the Canon Chancellor (organiser of the lecture series) said he didn't believe me. He insisted that I had said what I had said only to avoid frightening traditional Christians! Not so. Jung's teachings offer an illuminated passage towards the articles of faith, but they do not remove either the need for faith or the fact of faith.

My aim, as the title of this summary declares, was and is to discover the possibility of authentic spiritual experience in the modern, secular and post-critical age. What is exciting and refreshing about Jung is that, by his invention of new set of conceptual images, he makes the categories of religious doctrine immediate. One might say that his work is a fulfilment of Coleridge's cravings when that poet and apologist said what he said about "evidences". I discovered that Jung's scheme of religious psychology cast light on the traditional biblical and metaphysical teachings; but far from removing the necessity of these teachings, they quickened and deepened the apprehension of them. Much that Jung wrote about the Shadow, for example, threw light on the problem of evil; but in *Being Saved* I rejected the notion that acceptance of one's personal dark side removes the need to square up to the objective presence of cosmic evil: what the Bible and the tradition of the church refer to as the devil.

The same can be said, of course, of Jung's teaching about the Anima and the Self as related respectively to the Persons of the Blessed Virgin and God himself. This teaching offers a productive and exciting cross-fertilisation of ideas: the psychology is rendered more profound by its relation to the dogmas of faith; and the dogmas are refreshed by the new psychological

insights. Thus I discovered that Jung offers one the possibility of authentic religious experience in secular times.

*Being Saved* is not only a comparison of Jung and Christian doctrine. Even as, encouraged by Altizer and Hamilton, I began to read Nietzsche, I discovered a similarity between some of the sayings of Jesus <sup>102</sup> and Nietzsche's "Gay Science" <sup>103</sup>. But it was through my reading of Jung I learnt that many of Jung's key concepts were derived from earlier thinkers. His notion of Ego and Shadow, light and dark within the one personality, were gathered from his acquaintance with Goethe (1749-1832) - for this juxtaposition is precisely what is involved in Goethe's reworking of the Faust-Mephistopheles motif <sup>104</sup>. In much the same way, one can trace Jung's famous identification of the need for the masculine and feminine aspects to find union not only in the New Testament <sup>105</sup> but in Dante (1265-1321) <sup>106</sup> <sup>107</sup>. And again this *syzygy* is the *leitmotif* of Goethe's *Faust* - Faust's spiritual inter-twinedness with Gretchen. It is found again in *Tristan and Isolde* <sup>108</sup> and in scores of love bonds described in the literature of the western world since the Middle Ages. I wrote, "In one of Dostoevsky's novels, <sup>109</sup> the cold, sceptical Ivan is never accorded the usual familiar name Vanya - the reciprocal feminine ending. In another <sup>110</sup> the anti-hero Raskolnikov finds salvation through the love of the woman Sonya. All this is by way of saying that some so-called Jungian ideas do not derive exclusively or originally from Jung. But then every idea has a past.

The second part of *Being Saved* is some chapters which form an introduction to prayer. It is instructive for me to recall that while I was disturbed and even oppressed for long periods by what seemed to me to be the destructive negativity of much 1960s theology, I kept on saying my prayers and reading about prayer. I began this second section with a chapter concerned with the worshipper's adoration of God and I remarked on the usefulness of the work of Pierre de Caussade (1675-1751). What I learnt from Jung was that the names or

descriptions which people may choose to describe themselves - “believer” or “atheist” - do not always alter psychological/spiritual contents which can go deeper than nomenclature. For example I drew attention to the fact that Caussade’s teaching on self-abandonment is something that can be practised with profit by believer and atheist alike. And that Camus’ (1913-1960) sayings about the need to give up hope <sup>111</sup> are not very far from the old injunctions to rest in God; for what he means by giving up hope is that we should abandon the neurotic habit of living in a nostalgic past or a fanciful future. Indeed, I came to believe, and perhaps even understand, that the deep realities of spiritual experience are affected only superficially by one’s own self-description whether as “atheist” or “believer”. I began to see, for example, certain paragraphs in Wittgenstein - passages which are not explicitly and certainly not dogmatically theological - as profoundly true evocations of what it means to be spiritual <sup>112</sup>. That is to say, my reading of Jung and my subsequent attempts to write about possible resemblances between his thought and the doctrines of the Christian faith, enabled me to look with fresh eyes at some of the traditional spiritual teachings and how these are similar to the insights of secular writers. I also found in William James’ (1842-1910) distinction between “the once born and the twice born” <sup>113</sup> a clearer exposition of the spiritual concepts behind Jung’s distinction between those who become conscious of the workings of the individuation process within themselves and those who do not <sup>114</sup>.



## **The Practice of Authentic Spirituality as Described in My Book *Death Be Not Proud***

### **Argument and references for the ideas expressed in this section.**

The next book among those I have submitted is embodied in a very direct sense. As a parish priest I spent much of my time helping parishioners cope with death and bereavement and I had been thinking for a while that I might try to set down some ordered thoughts on these subjects, when my own father died of lung cancer. I decided, for a complicated mixture of reasons, that I would write the book in his memory and the result was *Death Be Not Proud*. This book certainly contains sustained arguments, but the arguments are not presented, for the most part anyhow, as a series of theoretical statements. Chiefly they are rooted in certain actual experiences of my own and in other episodes which actually happened, even if they did not happen to me directly. The book begins with a chapter on *The Fear of Death*. It is at the very start the recollection of an episode which occurred when I was five years old:

“As we hurtled round the corner, we met another of our friends. He was sitting on the pavement, clutching a dirty handkerchief to his face, wailing at the top of his voice. We discovered the coal lorry had run over his dog. All my earlier elation evaporated. The blaze of July might have been a January fog. It was the first time that I can recall seeing someone else in utter misery. So I became miserable too. The puzzling thing was Why? Michael’s Hanson’s dog had never been my dog. I had not even liked the dog much - Michael Hanson neither, if it came to that”.

Death is a spiritual theme *par excellence*: “The distinguished thing” <sup>115</sup>, as Henry James (1843-1916) put it; the theme which, along with love according to Goethe, must be part of every truly great work of creative writing. Given my Jungian background, I might have begun *Death Be Not Proud* with, “Death is a universal, archetypal experience etc...” But that form of expression seemed to me tired out if not half-dead itself. Moreover, it was not the sort of

language that was ever going to lead anywhere or reveal anything to the writer, let alone to the reader. I recalled the thrill I felt when I first read C.H.Sisson's (1914-) words, "No use filling books with what you know already"<sup>116</sup>. And indeed there is a popular view of the writer who *knows* things or who *researches* topics and then sets down in joined up writing what he has all the time known or arduously researched. There is a fine epigram attributed to Wilson Mizner (1876-1933) <sup>117</sup>. What I was discovering was that, for me anyway, such things as I might ever come to know must be gained by osmosis, by reading certainly, the central and basic texts of our civilisation over and again, but also by going around with one's ears and eyes open and one's antennae set at Maximum Sensitivity. It is painful to be like this all the time and perhaps it is connected to what Eliot said about decent writing as something which is produced out of chronic anxiety and even unhappiness <sup>118</sup>. Taken too far this can lead to romantic excess and the creative flush of consumption which has led more than a few to become, with Keats (1795-1821) "half in love with easeful death"<sup>119</sup>. I do not believe one can search for spiritual experience or strive for effective writing directly, but that both these things are, as it were, by-products of something else: call it sensitivity, alertness, keeping one's eye on the ball - I don't know. At any rate, though these things are difficult, they are easier to achieve than to explain! One cannot, as Elymas or Simon Magus <sup>120</sup> discovered, make a direct bid for authentic spirituality, and to try to do so is to make oneself ridiculous in the way that "Life, liberty and the *pursuit* of happiness" is ridiculous. If there is one thing that guarantees that happiness will not be found, that is its *pursuit*. One's eye must instead be on some specific task. The ball is elsewhere.

I found that the attempt to write a piece of work such as *Death Be Not Proud* is like going into a trance or into contemplation for a few hours each day. You write a sentence - usually one born out of some anecdote, quote or lived experience - and the next sentence, and

the ones after that, grow organically. It is like writing music: the first few notes both open up but also circumscribe what it is possible to write next within the limits of musical form. It is the same, I find, when writing anything: it's one damned thing after another. One is mining an archive - the large interior library built up over thirty-five years and more of reading, marking, learning and digesting books and daily experience.

So, specifically, that formative experience concerning Michael's dog, how did it lead on in the narrative of *Death Be Not Proud*? Well, what followed it was not, immediately another anecdote, but part of a remembered poem which seemed as I was writing to make sense of the raw experience I had just described, and so this was the next paragraph set down in the book:

*...the backward half-look*

*Over the shoulder, towards the primitive terror.*

*Now we are come to discover that the moments of agony*

*...are likewise permanent*

*With such permanence as time has. We appreciate this*

*better*

*In the agony of others nearly experienced,*

*Involving ourselves, than in our own*<sup>121</sup>

In the agony of Michael Hanson. Precisely. And in the pursuit of the task of writing, in the concentrating mood, one is occasionally struck by accidental pertinence. I was groping for something about grief and agony, but what I also received was that phrase *With such permanence as time has*. That in a book which was to be about death! Indeed the anvil is struck and the spark jumps across, and happy is the writer if it arrives to bring fresh illumination. But how? I don't know. Some things, as Wittgenstein said, cannot be explained

but only *shown* <sup>122</sup>

Perhaps spirituality is the connections made by the mind and the heart between raw experience and the hinterland that one has built up over the years, sometimes more or less accidentally, out of scraps of theoretical and historical knowledge, fragments of poems, musical extracts, half-remembered bits of conversation, faces, places and the whole flickering, portable cinema of memory? Every new experience enters this hinterland of course and reshapes the terrain. I sometimes think we do not have a great deal of control when it comes to this reshaping. Events just barge in and find their place among all the other accumulated bits and pieces. Subscription to doctrines and a moral code - what used to be called a "rule of life" - are attempts to order the flux and give it a context; but if one tries to force this ordering then the result is artificiality and that lapse from the picture to the diagram, from the spirit that giveth life to the letter that killeth <sup>123</sup>.

When one tries to write about spirituality and its meaning, then a second order spirituality is created - as happens if, instead of absent-mindedly whistling a few notes, one writes them down on the stave. Then the tune enters the public realm, the world of shared experience and the opportunity for criticism arises. But an experience or an event may be described in many different ways and styles and this fact accounts for the notorious problem of authenticity. What is an account? What does *this* experience mean? "We had the experience but missed the meaning" <sup>124</sup>: Eliot's frustration is understandable.

When I was a boy, one of my schoolmates was killed when he was run over by the milk lorry. The whole school was extremely shocked and grief-stricken. That is what happened. This is how I described the events of that day in *Death Be Not Proud*:

"One of my school pals had been doing what we were always being told not to do: hitching a ride on the back of the lorry as it crossed the schoolyard. He fell off and the truck,

reversing, crushed him. The accident had happened before the start of morning school and so, as children came through the gate, we saw the tarpaulin covering our friend's body. There was the lorry with its half-unladen crates of milk. And there too was our headmistress saying nothing but waving us all briskly into school.

"No one spoke as we hurried through the door. I remember no more about the incident. Only that it was a cold, grey day. The tarpaulin and the policeman by the lorry. And our headmistress with her handkerchief in one hand, the other hand kept in perpetual motion as she rushed us all past the scene".

Is the second description better than the first, or is it only more flowery? At any rate, from that day in 1950 onwards, the experience was *there*. Every time I recalled it, I added to it and the spiritual hinterland was reshaped: but did it only become more cluttered? The question of judgement will not go away. Then, once I had written it down, the whole event became much more complicated; and more complicated again now that I am writing about what I had written. One recalls again William James' distinction between "the once-born" and "the twice-born": similarly, there is spirituality and then there is another vein of spirituality which is struck when one begins to *describe* one's experience.

Sometimes what gets written turns out to look like a bit of a poem - though there was no intention to write a poem. But then, as Sisson said, willed verses are not poetry, and all true poems arise irresistibly out of "the reluctant deposit on the mind's floor"<sup>125</sup>. A few pages further on in *Death Be Not Proud* I described how, as schoolboys, we were told of the death of King George VI. I will lift the passage off the page and rearrange it so that the words do not quite reach the margins:

"On 6<sup>th</sup> February 1952 I was again in the playground.

The whistle blew for the end of morning break.

A winter day when it barely lightened;

The sky solid, not grey but yellow

Over the black castle, Armley jail.

We stood in silence for a minute or so.

The King had died in his sleep at Sandringham that day”.

This sort of description *seems* to add depth to the experience. But does it or is it only sentimental, a purple patch? Poetry, as Pound said, *may* indeed be “language charged with meaning to the greatest possible extent” <sup>126</sup>, but “poetry needs criticism” <sup>127</sup>, as Donald Davie (1922-) has reminded us. Again from *Death Be Not Proud* and arranged as if for the *Blue Peter* “send us *your* poem” competition:

“I turned and called, Goodbye.

She waved.

A voice - not a voice you could hear -

But a voice inside my head

Abruptly and blandly said,

“You won’t see your grandma again”.

And next morning she was dead”.

There is a traditional form of poetry which expresses and expiates experience and so makes it spiritual, and this is liturgy: the tension between life and drama. Until comparatively recently in England, great chunks of liturgy were known by heart and so they brought to each generation in its grief or rejoicing the consolation or encouragement of our forbears. Now we have only the shuffled pack of new liturgies - the comfort of strangers. Traditional texts are indispensable to spirituality not because they are “beautiful language” but because they are the chosen and proven expression for those events in human life which do not change. There is no



such thing as “beautiful language” which is not language with its sleeves rolled up doing a job of work. Language without a job to do is only adornment: as Sisson says, “turning aside” <sup>128</sup>; as Wittgenstein says, “language idling”<sup>129</sup> The enemies of spiritual expression are sentimentality - “pretending to have feelings which one does not in fact have” <sup>130</sup> - and Kitsch. All attempts “to summon the spectre of a rose or follow an antique drum” <sup>131</sup> are doomed to spuriousness.

I began this essay by making a lot of fuss about the notorious difficulties which beset anyone who seeks an authentic spirituality in the modern age. But these difficulties can be overstated and the fuss be overdone. Every age thinks of itself as *modern*, and indeed so they all are. But the differences between one age and another are greatly outnumbered by the similarities. We may develop Cartesian doubt, Humean scepticism, Existential nausea or any number of the great varieties of idiosyncratic neurotic diseases, but the real and abiding complaint is the human condition. There has always been a form of intellectual, spiritual hypochondria which loves to boast about its exquisite difficulties as if these difficulties were new - as if, one might say, Job and Hamlet never had a problem. Much is made of the peculiar difficulties encountered by anyone trying to talk sense about spiritual things in our secular, scientific, post-critical age, and indeed these difficulties are peculiar; but they are *only* peculiar and conditioned by fashion and ideologies that pass in the night. By contrast, the abiding spiritual problem is that involved in trying to become reconciled to the human condition. This condition does not change despite all the windy talk of our new and sophisticated intellectual difficulties.

Since liturgies, prayers and scriptures are the most enduring exhibits of human spirituality, it is these things which describe our human spirituality the most succinctly. I will waste no time then, but simply appeal to a few of the sentences which, whatever the peculiar sensitivities of the passing series of modernities, will not go away:

“In the midst of life we are in death...He {man} cometh up and is cut down like a flower and never continueth in one stay”.<sup>132</sup>

“The days of our years are threescore years and ten; and if by reason of strength they be fourscore years, yet is their strength labour and sorrow; for it is soon cut off and we fly away”.<sup>133</sup>

“For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do”.<sup>134</sup>

“We have left undone those things which we ought to have done, And we have done those things which we ought not to have done”.<sup>135</sup>

Jung spent his life discovering the so-called archetypes and writing about them, but those few phrases are archetypes readily available in the common prayer, and hence common speech, of our aeon. They are true spirituality and true psychology for they tell truths about the human condition which survive the comings and goings of fashion in philosophical scepticism and conspicuous improvements in the standards of plumbing. No one who has lived with the most meagre shard of self-reflection can possibly doubt human mortality and the possibility - I will resist Schopenhauer's (1788-1860) “inevitability” - of moral failure.<sup>136</sup>

There are other archetypes, less forbidding:

“Wine that maketh glad the heart of man”.<sup>137</sup>

“There be three things which are too wonderful for me...The way of an eagle in the air; the way of a serpent upon a rock; the way of a ship in the midst of the sea; and the way of a man with a maid”.<sup>138</sup>

If, as I believe, the basic scriptural and liturgical texts of our civilisation describe so clearly and exactly the problems which define the human condition, then there is a *prima facie* case for thinking that the same repository of texts is not entirely in error when it proposes solutions. It would be preposterous to conclude that, having so precisely defined the disease,

these sacred texts fail in inspiration when it comes to prescribing the cure. As I put it at the end of *Death Be Not Proud*:

“The greatest and most reassuring comfort for me is the Bible’s psychological and spiritual realism. There is no lessening of the mystery, no way of lifting the veil and discovering what eternal life and heaven *mean*. But I find it impossible to doubt that the Bible and the Prayer Book - having got everything else right - should somehow falter and fall into sentimentality when it comes to the resurrection”. In any case, it is a mistake to look only for theological *explanations*: the best theology is not so much an explanation as *an immediate presentation of the central mystery*. The Creed does not explain anything: it symbolises. More, it is itself a living symbol. That is what the word “creed” means.

These formative texts do not stand alone: they *are* formative and they have consequently helped form comparable judgements. This, and not that “beautiful language” again, is what is meant by the claim that the Bible and the Prayer Book were at the centre of the creation of the English language: they are the religious register in English. It is certainly what is meant when we describe these texts as inspired. And the psychological-spiritual insights of the English (and wider European scriptural and liturgical tradition) have been enlarged upon in the greatest works of our civilisation. There are the works of the great poets such as Dante and Donne, of course. And man’s estate as described in *The Burial of the Dead* finds echoes in Shakespeare (1564-1616):

“Man that is born of a woman hath but a short time to live and is full of misery”<sup>139</sup>

“How weary, stale, flat and unprofitable seem to me all the uses of this world”.<sup>140</sup>

The sense that life is sometimes painful and experienced as futile is not after all a view of things confined to German nihilists of the 19<sup>th</sup> century or to Existentialist neurotics of the 20<sup>th</sup>. Shakespeare wondered aloud whether life is not all a tale told by an idiot, full of sound

and fury, signifying nothing <sup>141</sup>. A modern writer such as Paul Tillich writes movingly of our experience of “God’s absence”<sup>142</sup>. But what is this except the anthropocentric inversion of the theocentric Psalmist’s complaint, “My God, My God, why has thou forsaken me?”<sup>143</sup> The *sensation* is surely the same in both cases. And the sacred texts speak again and again of doubt, sin, guilt and expiation; but these topics pervade the so called secular novels of our age like an obsession: Tolstoy (1828-1910), Dostoevsky (1821-1881), Proust (1871-1922), George Eliot (1819-1880), Camus (1913-1960), Samuel Beckett (1906-1989) ... It is a very long list.

And the great scriptural and liturgical themes find expression and ingenious interpretation in surprising places. Even Freud (1856-1939) himself could not escape the Judaeo-Christian archetypes, though he tried to root his theories in the Greek myths.<sup>144</sup> Psychoanalysis declares that human beings are plagued by neuroses and in the grip of pathological complexes which can be cured only when their subconscious origin is recognised. This is a version in new jargon of the biblical summons to confession and repentance summarised in the Prayer Book’s injunction about “acknowledging and bewailing”<sup>145</sup>. The later work of Freud in which he developed his theory about the threefold structure of the personality, Ego, Superego and Id <sup>146</sup> amounts to the psychologising or subjectifying of the traditional metaphysical-spiritual view of the cosmos as Earth, Heaven and Hell. Marx (1818-1883) may be seen as the last Hebrew prophet, perhaps more for the tone of his work than its content. However, as Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) once pointed out, Marx’s philosophy of history amounts to a straightforward demythologisation of classical Christian eschatology:

<b>“God</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>Dialectical Materialism</b>
<b>The Messiah</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>Karl Marx</b>
<b>The Elect</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>The Proletariat</b>
<b>The Church</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>The Communist Party</b>
<b>The Second Coming</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>The Revolution</b>
<b>Hell</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>Punishment of the Capitalist</b>
<b>The Millennium</b>	<b>=</b>	<b>The Communist Commonwealth</b>

The iconoclastic Nietzsche (1844-1900) would not have been able to say that God is dead unless Moses and the prophets had not first said God is alive.

Spirituality then may be seen as a continuous process of contemplation, reaching across the generations and the centuries, in which the main themes and motifs which have shaped our culture and civilisation are repeatedly reinterpreted. On this view there is no need for despair or for the broken-hearted cry that spirituality is impossible in a secular, scientific age; for, whatever the cultural climate, there is always spirituality. What else could there be? The themes remain, inescapably present in our libraries, concert halls, art galleries and architecture - even in our cathedrals and parish churches.

What limits might be set, or even ought to be set, to the scope of this contemplative process? On this issue, people might usefully, in a picturesque metaphor, be divided into “catholics” and “protestants”: the “catholics” are those who are prepared to take a broad view, even a Baroque view, and allow great latitude when it comes to the legitimacy of any particular reinterpretation; while the “protestants” constantly search for the purest spirituality by which they usually mean that which seems to them the most faithful to perceived origins. This, albeit

rough and ready, distinction can be applied to whole epochs. Thus the Middle Ages, with their elaborate and allegorical interpretations of the primitive tradition, might loosely be described as “catholic” in this metaphorical sense (as well as Catholic in the ecclesiastical sense); and the Reformation, with its insistence on doctrinal formulae and precise lexical definitions as “protestant” as well as Protestant. Or else this difference of approach to spirituality and the historical process in which it is both embodied and buried might be described as that which exists between those who hold to only a very few “pure” ideas and principles and the others for whom everything that happens is welcomed as grist to their spiritual-cultural mill: the aloof Kantians, as it were, with their noses in the air; and the sociable Hegelians with their noses in the trough.

Of course, “a whole epoch” should not be measured in terms of passing years or centuries but with regard to the speed of communications. In Augustine’s (354-430) time the widespread promulgation of an idea or a doctrine might take a generation; but Luther (1483-1546) had the advantage of the printing press and so he could ensure for himself a similar hearing within perhaps twelve months; in our day an idea may be broadcast ten times around the world before breakfast. And it is this fact, and not some convoluted Hegelian notion of action-reaction, which has generated post-modernism as the successor of modernism. The sheer speed and universality of communications means that we are being bombarded with new (or at least novel) cultural messages. It is a subject of debate whether this input is enrichment or attenuation - or both.

In an age of instant communications, and under a world system that might be described as technological democracy, the pie ‘n’ mix culture of post-modernism is bound to prevail. Only a global catastrophe could slow things down. It is not impossible: remember the Flood. Or perhaps nowadays we find ourselves on the escalators in a new Tower of Babel? One of the

more enduring of Jung's contributions was the reminder that the concept of Apocalypse is not redundant. Or, as T.S.Eliot said,

*It is hard for those who live near a police station*

*To believe in the triumph of violence.*

*Do you think that the Faith has conquered the world*

*And that lions no longer need keepers?*

*Do you need to be told that whatever has been can still be?*

*Do you need to be told that even such modest attainments*

*As you can boast in the way of polite society*

*Will hardly survive the faith to which they owe their allegiance?*<sup>147</sup>

Try as I might, I could not manage to keep my snout out of the trough. Some sophisticated people are able to receive their spiritual insights from all quarters and certainly there is a trend towards multiculturalism. The Bishop of Ripon, for example, took a whole six months sabbatical to study Buddhism and the tales are legion of how since his return he has gone about spreading alien enlightenment throughout the Yorkshire Dales. It has been often remarked that it is as hard to change one's religion as to change one's language.<sup>148</sup> Some manage to pull it off - but then some people are multilingual, and I am not. Of course, it is possible, and even likely, that a devotee of one faith will be sensitive to insights which originate in another; but what he lacks is the experiential context in which to set these insights. There have been more than enough jibes at the practitioners of "Hampstead Buddhism", and indeed there is amusement to be gained from the surreal image of all those Yorkshire farmers, for whom the Bishop has the cure of souls, meandering among the dry stone walls and musing

upon Nirvana. The fact remains that one's religion tends to be tied to particular places and specific formative historical events. Those farmers, for instance, will feel that what went on between King Charles' men and Oliver Cromwell ten miles away at the 1644 Battle of Marston Moor is more significant for them than Guatama's sojourn under the tree; and even that St Matthew's account of the Flight into Egypt has greater resonance than the Prophet's flight from Mecca to Medina.

At the beginning of *Death Be Not Proud* I described the overpowering and strange emotions I felt as I saw Michael Hanson weeping for his dead dog. Later, when I had grown up, I saw these sorts of feelings presented not only in T.S.Eliot's evocations in *The Waste Land* but evoked revealingly in the work of Rudolf Otto (1869-1937). These sensations arise out of an apprehension of what is holy and the original meaning of holiness, as Otto pointed out, is "other"<sup>149</sup>. I also discovered that this strangeness is not easily deflected by humour but, on the contrary, can even be intensified by the application of insightful comedy as Tom Stoppard (1937- ) showed in his reworking of *Hamlet* as a comedy:

*Do you ever think of yourself as actually dead, lying in a box with a lid on it? ...If I asked you straight off - I'm going to stuff you in this box now, would you rather be alive or dead? Naturally, you'd prefer to be alive...you could lie there thinking, well at least I'm not dead...* <sup>150</sup>.

I wanted to show that these deep apprehensions of what is numinous are closely connected to problems about the meaning of life itself. I illustrated this point by references to various attempts to locate spiritual or existential meaning, first in Camus' views on "the Absurd"<sup>151</sup> in which the story of Sisyphus' endless rolling of the stone up the hill itself takes on numinous power; then in Heidegger's (1889-1976) notion that *Dasein* (man) is "thrown" into the world where he has to find his "authenticity"<sup>152</sup>; and also in Sartre's (1905-1980)



characterisation of the experience of life as “nauseous” <sup>153</sup> which view is rooted in the old idea of “the sickness unto death” <sup>154</sup>. I demonstrated that these numinous sensations of purposelessness, though they are usually taken to be the topic of modern, generally atheistic, writers, actually have their roots in the Old Testament and in particular in the spirituality of the Psalmist: only where modern Existentialists or Absurdist such as Samuel Beckett blame their sense of meaninglessness <sup>155</sup> on the alleged non-existence of God, the Psalmist speaks of God’s absence <sup>156</sup>. The Psalmist asks, “Why art thou so far from me and the voice of my complaint?” <sup>157</sup> whereas such as Sartre objectify this sensation in propositional atheism. <sup>158</sup>

I went on to suggest that art, music and literature are ways in which the fact and reality of death can be faced and transformed into something living. The process of artistic creation is a way of achieving a perspective on death and therefore to some degree of transcending it. Beckett described his work as an attempt “To leave a stain on the silence”. <sup>159</sup> Eliot dwells on the subject of death throughout *Four Quartets* <sup>160</sup> and it is because (like the Psalmist) he is willing to make this journey through the valley of the shadow of death <sup>161</sup> that he is able to conclude this his most mature work with an exhilarating celebration of life. <sup>162</sup>

The sublimation of death is Mahler’s (1860-1911) life work. He asked, “Why do we live? Why do we suffer? Is all this a great horrible jest? We must answer these questions if we are to go on living, if we are only to go on dying” <sup>163</sup>. And each one of his nine completed symphonies includes a funeral march. In each symphony Mahler believed he had found answers to his agonised questioning, but each time his conviction faded and he had to begin all over again <sup>164</sup>. In at least three other of his major works, the theme is death and acceptance <sup>165</sup>. So, I argued, we all need to make some sense of death in order as it were to live with its frightening inevitability.

What is the reason for the extraordinary spiritual and emotional power of Mahler’s

music? From the 1960s onwards he has become something of a cult figure throughout the western world and his symphonies have been recorded and re-recorded by all the leading conductors and orchestras of the day. There is what might be described as a spiritual directness to his work and I should like to offer some suggestions as to its mechanics and derivation.

First, the music is extremely tuneful - though see the remark by Arnold Schoenberg in my *Appendix*. One can actually sing or whistle Mahler's tunes. Secondly, it is dramatic, one might say with accuracy, *melodramatic* and it is scored on the grand scale: the Fifth Symphony, for example, calls for a doubling of the trumpet parts; also the scoring is for unusual instruments such as cowbells (in the last movement of the Second, for example) and a block of wood (in the climax to the Sixth). The epic quality of the symphonies and the innovative, daring scoring assist the music's power of spiritual penetration. Mahler therefore overwhelms the listener: one is either impressed and moved almost beyond measure or (as others have been) repelled by the naked emotionality of the music. Adored or despised then, but Mahler is rarely ignored.

But the emotionality is not divorced from intellectual content: here is no world of drowsy reverie punctuated by emotional shocks. The music is technically very advanced. For example, one device which Mahler uses to great effect is the long-drawn-out dissonant passage. All music derives its power from the process of dissonance-consonance. It is the dissonances that provide the interest, as it were. But the ear will not tolerate dissonance *only*. All the great composers in the western tradition employ the technique of resolution: that is to say a series of dissonances is finally resolved with a consonance; the music seems to come to rest and the longing for such resolution is satisfied in the listener. There are similarities between dissonance-consonance in music and the sexual act: the longer the tension is maintained, the more intense the pleasure; but unresolved tension would be unbearable! Mahler prolongs the tension longer

than any other composer in the whole western tradition - longer even than Wagner (Mahler's hero) in such as *Siegfried Idyll*.

Thirdly, and related to the last point, Mahler's music is highly chromatic. To explain briefly: the scale usually sung (the so called tonic-sol-fa) consists mainly of whole tones and leaves out most of the semitones. The chromatic scale uses all the semitones: (for a practical demonstration, try playing all the notes, black and white, in an ascending octave on the piano and you will have played a chromatic scale. The ear recognises chromatic intervals as in need of resolution, so a long chromatic passage builds up the emotional tension. Long sequences of dissonances occur in the heart-melting *Adagio* from the Fourth Symphony and in the *Adagietto* of the Fifth which has passed into the popular repertoire through its use by Visconti in the film *Death In Venice*. Mahler nowhere used the long adagio better than in the finale of the Third Symphony which he subtitles, "What love tells me".

Another way to produce a powerful emotional effect is to move from a minor key to a major: the minor differs from the major in having its third and sixth notes played a semitone flat. It is hard to describe in mere words the effect of moving from minor to major, but it is something like coming out of the darkness into the light: thus what may most efficiently be produced by this technique is a sense of redemption - after a troubled interlude, things become "all right" again. The most profound use of this technique in all Mahler (in my opinion) is the opening of the last movement of the Ninth Symphony in D Minor (always a tragic key for Mahler, as for Mozart <sup>166</sup>). This astonishing finale combines the movement from minor to major with an extended chromatic passage, so that the tension is almost unbearable and consequently the relief and resolution when it comes is profound.

By the time Mahler reaches this last movement, he has shifted the key chromatically from D minor to D-flat minor and he begins with a slow chromatic descent (played by the

strings in unison) which is then resolved on a major chord to begin the long hymn-like conclusion. (Many have thought this theme to resemble the famous hymn tune to the words of *Abide With Me*).

Music derives its healing, restorative, revelatory power (as do mysticism and Jungian psychology) from the transcending of oppositions into a new balance - which, as we have seen, Jung refers to as the *coniunctio oppositorum* worked out in the *Mysterium Coniunctionis*. In this overwhelmingly powerful climax to the Ninth symphony, Mahler employs just about all the resolutions it is possible to experience in musical terms: minor to major; unison to harmony; dissonance to consonance; chromatic to diatonic.

Fourthly, Mahler's music is spiritually evocative because it employs what might be called a strong narrative line. I don't just mean to refer to the programme notes and "plots" of his symphonies which Mahler supplied, but to the shape of the music itself. Again the historical background is important for an understanding of this. In the 16<sup>th</sup> century generally western music had about it a static quality: in other words it was constructed vertically rather than horizontally, contrapuntally rather than melodically. It is the counterpoint of a piece which gives it its richness and depth, and its melody which moves it along, makes the listener feel that it is going somewhere, that it tells a story. 16<sup>th</sup> century music of such as Thomas Tallis (1505-1585) and William Byrd (1543-1623) is contrapuntal rather than melodic - for a fine example

of this listen to Tallis's superb forty part motet *Spem in Alium*.

By the time of Bach (1685-1750) music combines counterpoint and melody in the language of the Baroque. Mozart (1756-1791) and Beethoven (1770-1827) were masters of counterpoint of course but in first the *galant* and then the *romantic* styles these two composers rather stressed the melodic aspect: music became a narrative, a tale that is told; it was certainly "going somewhere". As the 19<sup>th</sup> century progressed, music became more and more melodic, more and more narrativistic: *The Ring* by Wagner is the epitome of this style - or it was until Mahler came along almost as it were to out-Wagner Wagner. Mahler's music stretches out the narrative almost to the point of rupture. In fact in his unfinished Tenth symphony the rupture actually occurs and the narrative line disappears under the pressure of intense harmonic forms and structures. At the same time, music became more chromatic and less diatonic. This marked a violent change and disruption in western music in which the whole notion of key signatures was abandoned in favour of the atonal music of Arnold Schoenberg(1874-1951). Interestingly, subsequently, there has been something of a return in the work of some important modern composers to the contrapuntal style of such as Tallis and Byrd - albeit a return transformed through the techniques of first atonalism and then twelve-tone: one thinks of the static, meditative character of a thoroughly modern piece, *Lux Aeterna* by Gyorgy Ligeti (b.1923). It is like listening to *Spem in Alium* harmonised by Schoenberg.

It may be productive to speculate on what these changes in musical form and expression signify. Perhaps the earlier static sort of music before the 16<sup>th</sup> century paralleled and reflected the static, hierarchical medieval view of earth and heaven, with all the angels, powers, principalities, men and God himself in tiers. Well, the music consists of chords piled up contrapuntally upon one another. The narrative style developed by Mozart and Beethoven - and one is never in doubt that a Beethoven symphony is "going somewhere"! - may be taken to

reflect the more dynamic, technologically-driven modern world. It is significant to see that it was precisely this narrative-driven and purposeful style which broke down on the eve of the First World War and at a time when traditional forms were being radically altered in other artistic movements: one thinks of Cubism in Picasso and, a little later, the poetry and prose of fragments assembled by such as Eliot in *The Waste Land* - "These fragments have I shored against my ruins" - and James Joyce (1882-1942) in *Ulysses* (both 1922, incidentally). Certainly brokenness, incompleteness, fragmentation and alienation are the hallmarks of the modernist crisis in spirituality as well as in art. All these things are contained in Mahler's music, while at the same time there is enough in him of what is traditionally melodic and tonal to make him sound reassuring. He orchestrates at once alienation and nostalgia, but he does so largely in styles which are familiar. In Mahler the mould, as it were, is cracked in a thousand places but it is not quite, or not yet, entirely broken. This is the reason why for many people music "stops" with Mahler: he was the last in the great tradition of Viennese composers to write music in recognisable keys. After Mahler the deluge.

Fifthly, the quality of burlesque and parody is prominent in Mahler and that too is a feature of modern art. There is of course the spoof *Frere Jacques* - but as a funeral march in a minor key in the third movement of the First symphony.

There is also the opening of the Fifth in which Mahler skittishly recalls Beethoven's Fifth - perhaps the best-known symphony in the entire repertoire. You will remember the start of the Beethoven: "di-di-di-dah", actually the *descending* movement of a minor third in the key

of C-minor.

Mahler audaciously upstages Beethoven by setting his own Fifth symphony in C-sharp minor - a semitone sharp of Beethoven's. Again he uses the "di-di-di-dah" motif of Beethoven, only this time in an *ascending* minor third.

Parody and burlesque are part of the fragmentary spirituality of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and they occur frequently in Mahler's output - together with those other threatening sounds of alienation and longing for rest and resolution, and for the discovery of a sense of meaning that will persist even in the waste land of the modern experience.

*Death Be Not Proud* explores the phenomenology of death, but it is also intended as a book of pastoral help. These two aspects are inseparable: indeed, throughout my work I insist that theory and practice must go together precisely because we are not as Lady Ottoline Morrel said of Bertrand Russell in his dressing gown, all disembodied mind, and human life is not only an intellectual adventure; the feelings too must therefore be part of what is being discussed.

So next I turned to an interpretation of the actual experience of death. What is it like? It is like nothing else as William James said <sup>167</sup>. The sense of acceptance which James described and which Mahler expressed musically in *The Ninth Symphony* and *Das Lied von der Erde* is a

desirable spiritual/psychological state involving what is mystical:

“Teach us to care and not to care: teach us to sit still” <sup>168</sup>. Eliot quoted this in *Four Quartets* and he expressed a similar sentiment in words of his own <sup>169</sup>. Here in this discussion of the need for acceptance I drew again on my reading of Jung who, in his outline of the process of individuation, described the first part of life as a journey outwards and the second part as the journey home <sup>170</sup>. There is a sort of unreflecting consciousness which is proper for the first half of life which is out of place in the second half. Among many who have made this point, G.K.Chesterton puts it epigrammatically when he says we should not “stretch the folly of our youth to be the shame of age” <sup>171</sup>. The experience of death is not just an individual’s private affair but it is also public and social: “Any man’s death diminishes me” <sup>172</sup> expresses very well the fact that death is a matter central to the creation of ethics. It follows that how we behave towards others will have some influence on how we come to terms with ourselves, including our own death. There is a need for self-acceptance and this is related to our acceptance of others: to be “in love and charity with your neighbours” <sup>173</sup> for if “the sting of death is sin” <sup>174</sup> then “charity shall cover the multitude of sins” <sup>175</sup>. Moreover, I suggested that death, because it is inevitable, is not something to be feared but at the right time welcomed. D.H.Lawrence (1885-1930) knew this when he said we must learn to prepare “our little ship of death” <sup>176</sup>. Mahler expressed this in *Das Lied*. And, of course, both men were repeating something that had been affirmed already by St Francis (1181/2-1226) when he wrote of “our sister death” <sup>177</sup>.

Of course, people have to come to terms not only with the inevitability of their own death but with the death of close friends and relations. In a chapter on bereavement I suggested that the fact of death should feature in the education of children from an early age: they should be allowed to accompany adults at the graveside, for instance. The attempt to evade the fact of death and to pretend it doesn’t really happen generally leads to neurosis - as it must, for it is a



false perception. Euphemisms do not serve us well when we come to face either our own death or that of others. This is well-expressed in two of the most influential of 20<sup>th</sup> century novels: Evelyn Waugh (1903-1966) brilliantly satirised the euphemistic approach in *The Loved One* <sup>178</sup> as Aldous Huxley (1894-1963) did in *Brave New World* <sup>179</sup>. Even modern translations of the Bible invent euphemisms for the nastiness which surrounds death<sup>180</sup>, and contemporary Anglican liturgies practise a similar coy evasiveness <sup>181</sup>.

I believe that the Christian Church has not always shown Christian sympathy for the person who is driven to suicide which it counts as a mortal sin. And the Jewish scriptures of the Old Testament seem similarly to condemn it in at least six separate places <sup>182</sup>. The Greeks of Plato's time (c428-348BC) were among those for whom suicide was a shameful act <sup>183</sup>. In the early church suicide was condemned by Lactantius (250-325) <sup>184</sup> and vehemently by St Augustine (354-430) <sup>185</sup>. Later it was prescribed that suicides were to be denied Christian burial and prayers <sup>186</sup>. Suicide was defined as a crime in English law until as late as 1961.

These rules were applied with varying degrees of strictness and a minority of priests and ministers has always been prepared to give Christian burial to suicides. The Roman Catholic Church now states, "The Church prays for those who have taken their own lives"<sup>187</sup>.

Not all civilisations and governments have prohibited suicide however and in any case, by the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance when the authority of the Church was more strongly disputed, the ethics and psychology of suicide were discussed openly in England, nowhere more famously than in *Hamlet* <sup>188</sup>. But Shakespeare makes plain that this is not merely an intellectual debate for we are bodies, parts and passions whose concerns are not exhausted by but rather "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought" <sup>189</sup>. Moreover, Shakespeare has a traditional Christian awareness of the connection between death and sin <sup>190</sup>. And Shakespeare's (or rather Hamlet's) justification of suicide is as modern as Samuel Beckett or

Albert Camus: it is of suicide as an escape from the alleged meaninglessness of this world and the sorrow which that sense of meaninglessness produces <sup>191</sup>. Actual social structures may produce a sense of *anomie* (literally “lawlessness”) and the seminal work on this condition is to be found in Emil Durkheim (1858-1917):

“Anomie, therefore, is a regular and specific factor in suicide in our modern societies; one of the springs from which the annual contingent springs. So we have here a new type of suicide to distinguish from the others. It differs from them in its dependence, not on the way in which individuals are attached to society, but on how it regulates them” <sup>192</sup>. If the 20<sup>th</sup> century has produced societies in which, as Durkheim claims, social rules tend no longer to govern individual conduct, then it has also produced, through technological innovation, according to Al Alvarez, “a breakthrough which has made a cheap and relatively painless death democratically available to everyone” <sup>193</sup>.

After the decline of the authority of religious dogma in the west, the taboo of suicide was weakened generally and Voltaire (1694-1778) even treated the issue with some levity:

“Creech, the commentator on Lucretius, noted on his manuscript, ‘N.B. Must hang myself when I have finished’. He kept his word. Had he taken on a commentary upon Ovid, he would have lived longer”<sup>194</sup>. Nietzsche (1844-1900) is similarly phlegmatic:

“The thought of suicide is a great consolation: by means of it one gets successfully through many a bad night” <sup>195</sup>.

Suicide can also be a religious act, according to Dostoevsky. He gives us the character Kirilov who wants to kill himself “because it is *his* idea” <sup>196</sup>. But it is Schopenhauer who rails most fiercely against the Christian teaching that suicide is morally wrong:

“The clergy cannot point to a single biblical authority, nor produce a single sound philosophical argument; it being made clear that what one wants is reasons and not empty

phrases and abuse”<sup>197</sup>. He conveniently ignores those aforementioned half dozen or so acts of suicide in the Old Testament which are said to incur God’s displeasure. But Schopenhauer certainly thinks he himself has discovered a good reason for the prohibition on suicide. Paradoxically he says that, far from its being the ultimate act of self- denial, suicide is the grandest act of self-assertion - and this assertion, the will, is precisely what is to be repudiated according to the Schopenhauerian philosophy:

“Far from being denial of the will, suicide is a phenomenon of the will’s strong affirmation. For denial has its essential nature in the fact that the pleasures of life, not its sorrows, are shunned”<sup>198</sup>.

Other writers agree with Schopenhauer’s view of suicide as an act of selfish affirmation, as a way of avenging oneself on a heedless world by emotional blackmail:

“ I wish that I was dead. Oh, they’ll be sorry then.

I hate them and I’ll kill myself tomorrow...” but the poem ends,

“The grown up voices still up late,

Indifferent to his rage as to his fate”<sup>199</sup>.

For my own part, I would prefer to be numbered among those clergy and rabbis who have historically taken a lenient attitude towards those who end their own lives. I do not believe any of us is in a position to know everything that goes on in another person’s head, let alone his heart. And I concluded even that...

“...the self-hate and perplexity that leads some of us to suicide is also part of the indivisibility which is redemptive suffering”.

The last part of *Death Be Not Proud* is an attempt to describe how the Christian faith enables us to face with confidence the fact of our own mortality. Of course the resurrection narratives in the New Testament and the teaching of the church concerning the life of the

world to come were the basic source material for this description, but so also were the writings of the metaphysical poets on the subject - as exemplified by John Donne (1572-1631):

“One short sleep past, we wake eternally,  
And death shall be no more; death thou shalt die”<sup>200</sup>

And I outlined reasons for believing how both an affinity with the world of nature and a related feeling for artistic creation can assuage the fear of death and offer a way of transcending it. At the end of one of his last works, Mahler (1860-1911) writes,

“My heart is quiet and awaits its hour. Everywhere the good earth once more greens and blossoms into spring. Everywhere. Forever. Distant spaces shine light blue! Forever! Forever”<sup>201</sup>.

That is not a propositional argument. It is an ecstasy of acceptance. And the ecstasy comes not so much through the words (which, it has to be said, are not the finest poetry ever written) but through the music to which they are set. Thus does music enable us entry to a world which may be beyond that described by analytical philosophy or even the propositions of theology. Schopenhauer certainly thought so:

“The composer reveals the innermost nature of the world, and expresses the profoundest wisdom in a language that his reasoning faculty does not understand”<sup>202</sup>.

Schopenhauer and Mahler were not alone in the prime place they afford to music as a generator of meaning. Plato wrote:

“Music is a moral law. It gives a soul to the universe. It is the essence of order and leads to all that is good, just and beautiful, of which it is the invisible, but nevertheless dazzling, passionate and eternal form”<sup>203</sup>.

It is of course a strange thing when one employs words to speak of how words can be transcended. But it is a stranger thing still to imagine that a practitioner such as Beethoven

(1770-1827) was merely deluded into the hyperbolic sense when he wrote:

“ I must despise the world which does not know that music is a higher revelation than all wisdom and philosophy”<sup>204</sup>.

At any rate it is hard to disregard the opinions of Beethoven concerning the meaning of his art just because he was not an analytical philosopher! Well, it was an analytical philosopher of rare accomplishment who denigrated the relegation of music to the level of mere entertainment:

“People nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them, poets, musicians etc to give them pleasure. The idea that these have something to teach them - that does not occur to them” <sup>205</sup>.

I concluded this part of *Death Be Not Proud* by saying that the move towards meaning in art and music is indirect: to portray, say, the crucified Christ in a picture by Velasquez or in Bach's *St Matthew Passion* is a way of insisting that these things have meaning. As Wittgenstein says, they have something to teach us even though they are not propositional statements. “Some things can only be *shown*” <sup>206</sup>. Part of the difficulty with this approach derives from the fact that the appreciation of what art and music have to teach us is itself an art and a skill that has to be learnt, that has to be practised. Anyone of reasonable intelligence and who understands a written language ought to be able to follow a philosophical argument - at least, as J.L.Austin said in another context, halfway “up the garden path” <sup>207</sup>. But to learn to look at pictures and to listen to music until these things begin to teach is not something that can be achieved in a short time. There has to be a standing under before there can be understanding. Wittgenstein again: “Culture is an *observance*”<sup>208</sup>. But I am convinced there is spiritual truth in music and paintings, though this is not propositional truth.

The spectre of death as the terrifying Last Enemy has to be balanced by the vision of death as the Final Resting Place. The naturalness of death can be made to work for us, assuaging our fear so that we might even look forward to it:

“We thank with brief thanksgiving, whatever gods may be...

...that even the weariest river winds somewhere safe to sea”<sup>209</sup>.

Such propositional truth as we may possess is itself not uncomplicated. I believe that this truth is communicated by religious language and this sort of language is not plainly descriptive or referential in a straightforward way. It is the language of spiritual imagination hallowed over the centuries by time and use. It is, as Ian Ramsey (1915-72) said, a language requiring a particular sort of practised discernment which might be described as “waiting for the penny to drop”<sup>210</sup>; or as Enoch Powell (1905-1997) said, it is “supercharged language”.<sup>211</sup>

The Book of Common Prayer (1662) and the King James Bible (1611) are, as I said, the religious register in English. The verses and phrases in these books have infiltrated English consciousness and informed English speech for centuries so that even as late as 1999 a trade unionist will excoriate his workmate who refuses to join the strike shouting “Judas!” Or a schoolteacher might say, “Some fell on stony ground”<sup>212</sup>. One of the most remarkable things about these books is that they have proved themselves as brilliantly telling descriptions of human psychology and of such spirituality as we might have. They tell us we are “miserable sinners and there is no health in us”<sup>213</sup> and even “vile bodies”<sup>214</sup>. I do not believe that the BCP and the AV - having so accurately and unflinchingly described the nature of this life - falters into mere sentimentality when it speaks of the life of the world to come. So we can turn with confidence and a lively hope to such words as: “Our Lord Jesus Christ who shall change our

vile body that it may be like unto his glorious body”<sup>215</sup>.

## **What Is Original in *Death Be Not Proud*?**

There is only limited value in the *theory* of spirituality. Jung expounded a theory of psychological contents and in *Being Saved* I applied this to certain themes in Christian doctrine. Because that book is a discussion of religious psychology it cannot remain wholly theoretical: it must approach actual thoughts, feelings and dispositions. Still, it is rather more theoretical than *Death Be Not Proud*, a book in which I tried to apply the doctrines of traditional Christianity, reinforced by Jungian and other insights, to the practical business of daily living and, of course, of dying.

In chapters on dying, bereavement and the hope for life eternal, I found that the traditional Christian teaching concerning these things matches the patterns and moods of psychological processes. Indeed, it is the particular language in which these teachings are expressed which delineates the shape of our experience. The biblical and credal language are, as it were, the syntax of spiritual experience. There is such a discipline as the psychology of religion and there have been many outstanding contributors to it. But in *Death Be Not Proud* I discovered that the best, because the most accurate, the deepest and the most durable, psychology of religion is not provided by the thoughts of such as Jung (1875-1961), Paul Tillich or Martin Buber (1878-1965) - good as they are - but by the biblical and credal language itself.

There is a terse authority about these ancient words and their spiritual power is half balm, half spell. It is the spirituality of something like rhythm and incantation. There is an urtext. When Powell referred to this as a language that is "supercharged" he meant that it is peculiarly dense, as for instance in this example from The Solemnisation of Matrimony in the Book of Common Prayer: "With this ring I thee wed". Six words of one syllable. Nothing could be more condensed or distilled. Except perhaps this: "In the midst of life we are in



I do not claim of course that this profound and mysterious language should merely be applied indiscriminately and thoughtlessly, as if it were magic; or that it should take the form of rigid and unimaginative fundamentalism. It needs to be unpacked and provided with a commentary to fit particular circumstances. But no commentary, I found, is as good as the original texts. This second discovery of the shape and form of a possible spirituality for our age then consisted of an informed, intelligent and meditative application of the sacred texts leading to the further discovery that religious language is intensely practical. It is about a man of flesh and blood “walking”, “sowing” “eating and drinking”, and supremely contemplating his place in the whole scheme of things and the inevitability of his exit from this scheme. In other words, good psychology makes for true spirituality and the most pertinent and the truest spirituality is expressed in the traditional language.

This struck me as an original thought in an age which is much given to commentaries, jargonistic circumlocution and excessive discursiveness. It is original to see the originality of our textual origins. The temptation is to wait eagerly for the next book or theory to come along to *explain* the Bible. And the worse temptation is to the conclusion that the explanation makes the original redundant - just as some Jungians imagined that psychology can replace religion without remainder. My conclusion did not have meaning for myself alone. I spoke of the essence of spirituality as practical. And what I actually found was that the exercise of the practical pastoral ministry was the more effective the closer it approached the central texts. Those texts, I discovered, are the grammar of the western mind, be it never so secular and refinedly modern.

I was pleased with this discovery, as it seemed to be the case that spirituality is not only

possible in the modern age but in some sense necessary, inescapable - because our words are what we are and all our words have their sacred origins.

## **The Possibility of Authentic Spirituality as Outlined in *Reason To Believe***

In *Reason To Believe* I continued my exploration of the ways in which authentic spirituality is both doctrinally and psychologically based. So it contains brief discussions of central doctrines such as the Incarnation and the Resurrection, the sense of sin and guilt and our perception of the problem of evil. In a separate chapter it also develops the spiritual and psychological aspects of the feminine begun in *Being Saved* and the phenomenological approach to the study of spirituality is deepened and intensified.

I began with an outline of the so-called problem of evil: why is there so much suffering if the world was created by an all-powerful and all-loving God? The sceptical argument is lucidly expressed by David Hume <sup>217</sup> and only partly answered by Leibnitz (1646-1716) in his doctrine that this is “the best of possible worlds” <sup>218</sup> - an idea that was repeatedly savaged by Schopenhauer who was appalled by the sheer *amount* of human suffering and its terrifying intensity. Schopenhauer’s criticisms of this doctrine run like a *leitmotif* through *Die Welt Als Wille Und Vorstellung* and elsewhere he uses wit to devastating purpose:

“If anyone should doubt the preponderance of pain over pleasure in this world, let him compare the sensations of an animal eating another animal with the sensations of the animal being eaten”<sup>219</sup>

I argued that the sceptical argument is basically utilitarian but that there are more important things in life than trying to weigh how much we suffer - as if the world somehow existed for our benefit. But there is more to human existence than the pursuit of happiness. We are not merely “Mayfair clotheshorses or patent digesters” as Carlyle (1795-1881) reminded us <sup>220</sup>. Any sort of world supporting anything that could be likened to human life would be bound to contain suffering and evil: for the creation of a good world must involve the possibility of evil unless the inhabitants were mere automata or creatures similar to Wells’s (1866-1946) *Eloi*

<sup>221</sup>. Evil is the price we pay for being, and being with a certain amount of freedom. In consideration of whether we are in fact free, I am convinced by Kant's (1724-1804) arguments which begin with:

“Now I say that every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free...”<sup>222</sup>.

And continuing the phenomenological train of thought begun in *Death Be Not Proud*, I could not avoid the testimony of the Scriptures which insist that God is not infinitely removed from the sufferings of his creatures but personally involved in them. Some of the most moving verses in Jewish and Christian Scripture evoke this sublime mystery: “Put my tears in thy bottle”<sup>223</sup>; “Like as a father pitieth his own children, even so is the Lord merciful unto them that fear him”<sup>224</sup>; “God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son”<sup>225</sup> - the God of love flowing through the Scriptures like a balm. There can be no life worth living, no life with its *telos* unless it involves suffering. As St Paul puts it: “The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together...”<sup>226</sup>.

In the next chapter I tried to give an outline of prayer in its various forms and began with the notion of adoration, the response that is called forth by such words as, “Be still and know that am God”<sup>227</sup>. What actually calls forth this response is what Rudolf Otto calls “numinous”<sup>228</sup> and this quality can be experienced in sudden apprehension of the strange otherness of the natural world, for example in the frightening cliff which seemed in the darkness to follow William Wordsworth (1770-1850) across the lake<sup>229</sup>; in Eliot's “fear in a handful of dust”<sup>230</sup>; or more cheerfully in Gerard Manley Hopkins ecstatic vision in such as:

“Look at the stars! Look, look up at the skies!

O look at all the fire folk sitting in the air!”<sup>231</sup>

We find Holy Scriptures supremely evocative of the numinous sense which calls forth

the response of adoration, awe and wonder <sup>232</sup>. This awed response is the religious attitude *sui generis*.

In a section on sin and repentance I affirmed that both an acknowledgment of sin, the understanding that one has fallen short (*hamartia*) and that repentance, a change of heart and mind (*metanoia*) is necessary to a true sense of perspective upon oneself. These are not biblical precepts alone but can be found reworked in 20<sup>th</sup> century psychology, in for instance the works of Freud (1856-1939) who insisted on the need for *catharsis* for the alleviation of crippling guilt <sup>233</sup>. Again I referred to the way in which creative artists are sometimes able to resolve even pathological guilt through the act of creation. For example, the writing of penitential verses helped William Cowper(1731-1800) keep guilt-induced madness at bay (for a time):

“Return, O Holy Dove, return  
Sweet messenger of rest:  
I hate the sins that made thee mourn,  
And drove thee from my breast”<sup>234</sup>.

Even profound philosophical effort in exceptional individuals is inseparable from a disposition which for convenience we might refer to as original guilt. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) once asked Wittgenstein (1889-1951), “Are you thinking about logic or your sins?” and Wittgenstein replied, “Both!” <sup>235</sup>.

I mentioned two sorts of prayer: the intensely disciplined and schematic <sup>236</sup> and the passive almost quietist method of such as J.P.de Caussade <sup>237</sup>. This account of prayer is by no means exhaustive and much of the background for my chapter on the subject arises out of many years acquaintance with the words of the great masters of prayer - such words, as we have seen, which, in C.H.Sisson’s (1914-) words, “Form a reluctant deposit on the mind’s floor” <sup>238</sup>: from, for example George Herbert’s (1593-1633) assertion that, since *orare est*

*labore*, self-forgetfulness in work is prayer <sup>239</sup> to Pascal's (1623-1662) contemplative insight to the effect that all the troubles in the world arise out of a man's inability to keep quiet in his own room <sup>240</sup> and St Augustine's (354-430) in (for him!) an unusually quietist mood: "Lord, thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee" . <sup>241</sup>

The following chapters are an introduction to the two central doctrines of the Christian faith: the Incarnation and the Resurrection of Christ. The doctrine of the Incarnation was given classic expression in that fusion of ideas between the humanistic Antiochene Christological doctrine and its transcendentalist Alexandrian counterpart in the 5<sup>th</sup> century <sup>242</sup>. Because the Incarnation is central to Christianity (even the very meaning of Christianity) it has been under constant discussion from the earliest times and there has been a huge variety of views and emphases. St Thomas Aquinas believed that the Incarnation was contingent on the Fall of Man - that the coming of Christ was God's "remedy" for man's sin. <sup>243</sup> While Aquinas' near contemporary, Duns Scotus (1265-1308) took an opposing view, believing that the Incarnation was a free outpouring of God's love towards mankind and could therefore be contingent on no other event <sup>244</sup>. Luther tended to respond to the doctrine with a subjective emphasis produced by the awe-inspiring notion of the eternal God incarnate as a baby in the manger <sup>245</sup>.

Later "liberal" theologians, influenced by Kant's strictures on the limitations of knowledge, have stressed an immanentist view of Christ, interpreting his divine qualities in terms of the best human characteristics. Some expressed this view with extreme sentimentality such as, for instance, Ernst Renan (1823-92) <sup>246</sup> and others so reductively that the divine or transcendent element disappears altogether <sup>247</sup>.. Some self-consciously post-Enlightenment Oxford authors in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century took an even more extreme immanentist view <sup>248</sup> .

So called "Process Theology" offers an alternative to both the immanentist Post-Enlightenment and Romantic understanding of the nature of Christ. A.N. Whithead (1861-

1947) believed, “Neither God nor the world reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimately metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty”<sup>249</sup>. Process Theology was developed in a highly individual style by Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) who claimed that the creation as a whole is in a continual advance which he referred to as “Christification” - a progressively realised eschatology which will find its fulfilment in “The Omega Point”, the consummation <sup>250</sup>. A contributor to the 1960s movement, the so-called “Death of God” school, Thomas J.J. Altizer made the remarkable assertion that the meaning of the Incarnation is that “The death of God occurred in Jesus Christ”. He goes on, under the clear influence of Hegel (1770-1831) to describe this process: “The significance of the world negation is ultimately positive since it aims at the disclosure of the essential identity of the profane world with the sacred totality by overcoming its profanity” <sup>251</sup>.

In the chapter on the Incarnation I suggested that for the Christian the doctrine is the raw material of definitive mystery - language scarcely more intelligible than Altizer’s! I mean by this that the doctrine is definitive and unavoidable for the Christian believer. It is a *given* out of which each generation has to try to make sense. There is a particular sense in this appropriate to our time, a time in which through the insights of modernist poets and critics such as Eliot and Pound (1885-1972) we come to see that Word and Thing are inseparably bound together. We are neither disembodied minds nor inanimate matter. The doctrine of the Incarnation at the very least offers some symbolical expression of this fact.

In a chapter on the Resurrection of Christ, I argued that it is not logical to say that because some events do not *usually* happen they might *never* happen and I criticised particularly the view which says we may not believe in the miracle stories and the Resurrection “in an age of electric light and the wireless”; or, as Rudolf Bultmann says, “A corpse cannot come back to life or rise from the grave; there are no demons and no magic causality” <sup>252</sup>.

Belief in the resurrection and life after death arose late in the Old Testament period <sup>253</sup> probably as a moral or theological-teleological answer to the question of why the almighty and supremely righteous God allows his chosen people to suffer: he will make sure that justice is seen to be done in the life of the world to come. Such a view belongs almost exclusively to the later apocalyptic literature, but it makes a rare (and perhaps even unique) appearance in the prophets <sup>254, 255</sup>. In this belief the Jews at the close of the Old Testament period yet preserved their sense of an historical process under the guidance of God <sup>256, 257</sup>.

In the New Testament it is Jesus who pioneers the general Resurrection as “The first fruits of them that slept” <sup>258</sup> and for the gospel writers and St Paul his Resurrection is the cornerstone of the faith <sup>259</sup>. Against the criticisms made against him that he regards the Resurrection as an impossibility, Bultmann has replied that, on the contrary, it is for him a matter of faith <sup>260</sup>; and he interprets the New Testament accounts of the Resurrection so as to suggest that it was always a matter of faith <sup>261</sup>. But it may be asked whether Bultmann does not go so far as to make the issue entirely one of *sola fide*. The scholar as well as the ordinary man might well ask questions about the nature of this event so crucial for faith: *something* must have happened? <sup>262</sup>.

When the Resurrection of Christ is described as an act of God, it follows that our apprehension of it must be a matter of faith. The problem is to decide what “faith” means here. Augustine (354-430) believed that this faith was generated “by the truth of the divine power” so that the creation of faith is itself a miraculous act of God <sup>263</sup>. In contemporary usage, “faith” usually refers to an attitude or disposition which is not based on what can be inferred from facts (which might be termed “knowledge”) but which goes beyond such inferences. For many of the Church Fathers and theologians of the Medieval period however, faith is itself a kind of knowledge <sup>264</sup>. But for Martin Luther (1483-1546) the faith required to apprehend the action of



God in raising Jesus from the dead is the very opposite of the knowledge that is supposed to come from reasoning: “Reason is the greatest enemy that faith has: it never comes to the aid of spiritual things but struggles against the divine word, treating with contempt all that emanates from God”<sup>265</sup>. Kant (1724-1804) formalised the opposition of faith and reason<sup>266</sup> and this disjunction may be regarded as the origin of the same dichotomy found in the views of Existentialists from Kierkegaard (1813-1855)<sup>267</sup> to Bultmann (1884-1976)

Newman’s notion of “cumulating probabilities”<sup>268</sup> represents an attempt at a rapprochement between faith and reason. “He insisted that faith must rest on reason, but he was no less emphatic that ‘the faith and reason of which I speak are subjective, personal, private and unscientific’”<sup>269</sup>. To reason and faith must be added an act of will which for Newman is judgement. When we say that Christianity is the religion of the Incarnation, we are not speaking only about spirit becoming involved with flesh: incarnation is a philosophical, critical and phenomenological way of understanding the fact that truth is bound up with things and with images; and that doctrines express truth not in the abstract but in terms of life as it is lived. “The image is necessary for the insight”<sup>270</sup>.

Apologetics and the defence of doctrine compel the writer to face the issues of education and cultural relativism. The last two chapters in *Reason To Believe* are an attempt to do this.

I write as one who for four years was Chairman of the Bolton Association for Multicultural Education. This work did much to enhance my understanding of different cultural perspectives, but in the end these perspectives *remain* different. “A people without history is not redeemed from time”<sup>271</sup>. And religion is a matter of soil as well as soul. In my book *Reason To Believe*, the final chapter urges the need for the most profound respect and forbearance among members of different denominations and world faiths, but argues that the best way to promote

mutual respect and understanding is for each faith community to practise its own religion scrupulously. We recall the Old Testament commandments to the Jews - that they should be hospitable to the stranger within their gates <sup>272</sup>. And in the New Testament, Christ praised the Good Samaritan but he did not tell his listeners to adopt the religion of the Samaritans. Neither did he follow his statement about the faithful centurion: "I have not found so great faith - no, not in all Israel" <sup>273</sup> with an injunction to his followers to defect to the Cult of Mithras, popular among the soldiers in the Roman garrisons.

The wider ecumenism of the world religions movement, born out of the best intentions, quickly dissipates into what is only tenuous. This is bound to happen because ecumenical, multifaith statements are necessarily the product of diplomacy and artificially concocted concordats; whereas each particular faith community has developed, often painfully, over centuries. Such statements also frequently "falsify history and impose the Whig point of view"<sup>274</sup>. As the Chief Rabbi, Jonathan Sacks, said to me in an interview, "The best way to learn to love the Arab is by becoming a good Jew" <sup>275</sup>. In *Reason To Believe* I said,

"Pluralism works, if at all, only where religion is weak. Weaken religion then and abolish strife? But where religion is weakened and marginalised, in a fit of self-abnegation, as in English Christianity today, what does the nation live by? It will not live by the bland outpourings of utilitarianism. It will be taken over either by crass materialism or else some violent caricature religion...

"Pluralism is never suggested by people who feel strongly about religion, by people who are actually religious, but by others - academics, bishops and the like who derive their security not from the truths of religion but from the liberal-utilitarian consensus which stands back, as it were, and regards itself as the one privileged point from which *all* religions can be observed and evaluated. There is no such point in fact".

It was partly my experience with the Multicultural Association which led me to try to set out the fundamentals of my personal spirituality. I found encouragement in this attempt in what seemed the relentless denials of traditional doctrines by those who are paid to uphold them. 1993 was the thirtieth anniversary of the secularising theology which appeared in such works as *Honest To God* by Bishop Robinson and *The Secular Meaning of the Gospel* by Van Buren. In the intervening years the demythologising and debunking process had gone much further: the Incarnation of Christ was described by John Hick as “a myth” <sup>276</sup>, and the biblically- based teachings concerning the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection were repeatedly disparaged by senior theologians and churchmen as unhistorical - according to an extreme empirical view of history. Along with this historical disparagement went the usual Pelagian-Whig view which deprecated all talk of Original Sin and so, in my view, fatally misperceived human nature and the human condition.

I tried to apply the meditative, phenomenological method of which I have written earlier in this essay. I contemplated the doctrines, motifs and archetypes of faith and tried to make sense of them *in their own terms*. I was not very successful at the time and I would now criticise whole stretches of *Reason To Believe* for being too discursive and theoretical. Whereas the knack is so to embody what one writes in image and symbol that the argument takes on the appearance of indubitability. There is such a thing after all as a *body* of work. And incarnation is not only a specific doctrine about Jesus Christ, it is the Christian faith’s best shot at a theory of knowledge - which convinces precisely and paradoxically (one might say *crucially*) because it is *not* a theory <sup>277</sup>. It is instructive to discover that the phenomenological method is enthusiastically espoused by those liberal multiculturalists who claim that each world religion must be understood in its own terms according to what they describe as “ethnomethodology” and that to apply western critical or Christian perspectives in these cases is illegitimate; but that

when it comes to the study of classical Christianity, phenomenological and ethnomethodological principles are discarded and the faith is judged according to the criteria of Enlightenment Empiricism and Positivism.

## **What Is Original About *Reason To Believe*?**

The chapters on education and the possibility of a national church argue that authentic spirituality must acknowledge *something* as basic, as given. Minds must be filled with something <sup>278</sup>. I believe that it is a mistake to take as fundamental the multiculturalism which is widely promoted in educational institutions and in the World Religions movement. For this sort of multiculturalism assumes that there is some neutral, abstract position from which the individual can assess and evaluate the various religious perspectives. If there were such a position, it would itself assume the character of a religion - since, by definition, one's religion is what one daily takes most seriously. This is what Simone Weil has called "the experimental proof of the existence of God" <sup>279</sup>.

But religion, and therefore expressions of spirituality, are cultural, historic and institutional. One cannot change one's religion as one changes one's shirt or flit about among the various religions, taking a bit of doctrine from here and a bit from there <sup>280</sup>. If religion is the deepest and most binding activity in which we engage - and if it is not this, then it is a blasphemous sham - then we are not allowed to assume the attitude of the dilettante. One recalls Spengler's remark about, "The dishonest Buddhism of the drawing rooms" <sup>281</sup>. But to learn one's spirituality within a particular religious tradition does not imply hatred for all other religions or involve the individual in a denial of the truths of other faiths. The practice of one's religion is simply that: it is the practice of say Judaism, Hinduism or Christianity; that is to say it is one thing and not another. And the best way to cultivate in oneself respect for another's tradition is to understand one's own. This principle may be extended to society at large and it is a better promoter of both religious freedom and racial harmony than the disembodied multicultural philosophy of which it is the opposite.

Because there is no neutral perspective it follows that, for authentic spirituality to exist,

the individual must affirm, “Here I stand”. And he stands within a particular cultural and historic religious tradition. Even the atheist stands within such a tradition and it may be said without hyperbole that there are, for example, Christian atheists and Jewish atheists. The atheist is usually a person whose thinking is in opposition to a particular doctrine of God and not to gods in general. At any rate, that is usually how atheism is arrived at. There is no escaping the historic reality of tradition. I expressed this epigrammatically: Nietzsche was only able to say, “God is dead”<sup>282</sup> because Moses and Aaron had first told the Hebrews that God is alive<sup>283</sup>.

In my search for authentic spirituality I am striving to improve my practice of the phenomenological procedure and so, in keeping with my stated intention to become less theoretically attenuated and more rooted and grounded in the imagery of faith, I will end this section with a practical example. This example is practical in two senses: first, it tries to be an actual instance of the phenomenological approach, and secondly, it is produced for a real occasion, an occasion that could not be more incarnational. It is a Christmas sermon:

“How we miss Bishop David Jenkins of Durham now he has retired! He used to turn up every year a few days before Christmas - regular as Jack the Giant-Killer or Widow Twanky. And his clever, sceptical slogan for that year would appear in all the papers; his radical soundbite reverberate through the airwaves. To give him credit, David never actually said that the Christian faith is meaningless - for that you have to go as far as America and Bishop Spong - but he always said that the faith means something other than what it says. So David would say that there was - with that compulsory academic qualifier “probably” - no Virgin Birth. No wise men attended the manger. And such shepherds as there might have been stayed out in the fields with their flocks where, of course, they were serenaded by no angel choir - because there “probably” aren’t such things as angels. I wonder what the real angels sang,

*Hark! the herald angels sing,*

*Jenkins is the latest thing.*

The plain man might think that these sorts of sceptical or revisionary statements effectively deny the truth of the Christian faith. But radical bishops do not think as we think in the street. For such as David Jenkins, the Christmas story is an endless series of shifting metaphors for social justice, for care of the environment, or it might be vegetarianism, overseas aid and so on. The impression is of a practised dealer at the casino by night. He wears his green eyeshade at a rakish angle and the cards come tumbling out of his palms faster than you can count the spots on them.

The question will not go away though: is the Christian faith true? I feel this morning like the Irishman who when asked, "How do I get to Tipperary?" replied, "Well, I wouldn't start from here!" Asking whether the Christian faith is true or not is like asking if Westminster bridge is true. Westminster bridge is there and it is real. And so is the Christian faith. For the faith is not an hypothesis or a collected series of philosophical arguments - though of course one can legitimately argue philosophically *about* the Christian faith. But the more philosophically-sophisticated you become, the further you remove yourself from the reality of the faith.

The Christian faith is not a theory, it is a story. Next question: "But is it a true story?" I wouldn't start from there either. It is a story to which we all belong. It is how things are and how they came to be as they are. The Word is made flesh - that is, the story is tangible; it is full of things. This church and St Paul's up the road are part of the story. So are all the little village churches where they still say Matins from the Prayer Book and sing Wesley's hymns accompanied by a volunteer organist. Lights and windows, candles and bells: these are all part of the story. So is carols from Kings College.

The music of Bach's *Christmas Oratorio* in which the great man imagines the Nativity at Leipzig in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and wise men with snow on their boots. That is part of the story. And so is the ravishing architecture of Baroque churches which themselves look like the music of Bach transmuted into wood and stone. Go back further and you will find Anselm is part of the story - the wise guy who said, "God could not exist merely by accident, so his existence is either impossible or necessary; clearly it is not impossible; therefore it is necessary that God exists"<sup>284</sup>. Or Aquinas who said, "You must conclude either that the universe is no one's idea or that it is your own idea - unless you choose the only reasonable explanation that it is God's idea"<sup>285</sup>. "Pull down thy vanity"<sup>286</sup>.

Back and back to the 4<sup>th</sup> century and St Augustine's wonderful prayers such as, "O Lord, thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee". Back to the shepherds abiding in the fields. Gold, Frankincense and Myrrh. Back and back to the voice crying in the wilderness, to the lion eating straw like the ox, back and back to "every valley shall be exalted"<sup>287</sup>. - and the music of Handel which is inseparably tied to those words. Back to the time of our first disobedience and the sensational and spine-chilling bit about the voice of God walking in the garden in the cool of the day<sup>288</sup>. Back and back. Back and forwards. To Magdala now and Capernaum. To the loaves and fishes. To the upper room and "Take, eat. This is my body which is given for you"<sup>289</sup>. Back and forth to the manger and to Golgotha. We are led all that way for birth and death<sup>290</sup>.

We cannot take bits of the faith in isolation and test them for truth. We're not in the laboratory business here. We're in the sacred history business. How foolish it would be to try to understand the meaning of Bach's *Christmas Oratorio* by doing a forensic test on five bars of it! How wrongheaded it would be to try to see the significance of a masterly painting such as *The Journey of the Magi* by snipping off the bottom left hand corner of it and sticking it under



a microscope!

It is the same with the Christian story. You have to see the whole of it. It is a story with a beginning, a middle and an end. Now I have a question for the radicals and sceptics: if you really reckon that the Christian faith has got it wrong all these centuries, on the basis of what do you propose to put it right? The Christian faith in all its historic continuity and its theological plot is our story. That is what I meant when I said at the start that it is the story to which we belong. It is the story that tells it like it is with us. And we do not evaluate the story, it is the story which judges us. “Show me what you value and I will tell you what you’re worth” <sup>291</sup>.

And the story is glorious. Last Monday at our wonderful carol service we were given in all those songs and readings a brief outline of the whole story. The most moving part for me of a supremely moving occasion was towards the end when I had to walk up to the altar and say the Collect. As I walked with *O Come All Ye Faithful* sounding in my ears and with the recollection of Harold Darke’s *In The Bleak Midwinter* still hot in my mind, I realised that I with all the other people in this building were at that moment uniquely privileged: for we were singing the story; and our singing and reading and praying the story was the very latest part of the story itself. We had recounted the Christian story and now we were moving it onwards. No wonder I almost fell over with terror and joy! Now I begin to understand what “sacrificial priesthood” involves!

That is the comfort in the story - which is true as gospel, not as theory - that we all belong to it. It is the story of the babe in the manger and the redemption of the world. Our redemption. We belong to a tale that is true. It is the lovely, heartfelt story of our belonging. And no one can take it away from us. Not ever. God with us. And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth...” <sup>292</sup>.

## **The Outline of Authentic Spirituality in *Faking It: The Sentimentalisation of Society* and What Is Original About It.**

In my chapter in this book I try to identify intellectual and emotional perspectives and responses which produce unwholesome, inauthentic spirituality. Authentic spirituality requires adherence not just to a particular religious tradition but to the whole of that tradition. The selective application of doctrines leads only to a devalued, ersatz and Kitsch mode of religious expression and spirituality itself degenerates into sentimentality which is an inauthentic emotional response, “pretending to have feelings one does not in fact have”<sup>293</sup>. I believe that I have identified several examples of this inauthenticity and the conditions which it produces.

First, spirituality is inauthentic when it omits or undervalues fundamental doctrines of the faith. The Baptism and Burial rites in the Church of England’s official new Prayer Book, the so called *Alternative Service Book* are inauthentic in this sense. The Baptismal liturgy omits all the 1662 *Book of Common Prayer’s* references to the fact that human beings were conceived and born in sin, while the devil and all his works are not so much as mentioned let alone renounced. Thus all the promises of redemption and salvation are worthless. What is the candidate for baptism being saved *from*? All mention of real and palpable evils thus removed, the Baptismal Rite degenerates into sentimentality - “a prelude to the booze up and the cake. And of course the photographs. But photographs that will evidence *what*?” A similar accusation of sentimentality can be made against the Burial Service which squeamishly omits the BCP’s references to “vile bodies” and to the fact that “worms destroy this body”. It is the same failing we detected in the Baptism Service, as the failure to mention vile bodies renders the promise “that we shall be made like unto his glorious body” vacuous.

More generally, the omission of central parts of the historic tradition as expressed in doctrine and worship is bound to lead to inauthenticity. The new rites of the Church of

England and the liturgical practices in many of the so called Charismatic churches represent both a dilution and a distortion of teaching which leads to a fake or sentimental spirituality constituted chiefly of mere *niceness* and the desire not to give offence by, for example, describing (as the BCP does) human beings as “miserable sinners”. But to understate, or in some places not to state at all, the fact of sin and of Original Sin renders all the subsequent talk of God’s forgiveness and mercy valueless.

I believe the way in which I have identified and described inauthentic spirituality to be original. Of course, this identification of inauthentic spirituality does not complete my task throughout these cited works which has been to try to say what authentic spirituality might be; but it does give to the whole project a more exhaustive and rounded appearance.

**Appendix: Article: *The Way of Transcendence in Music* -**

***The Nine Symphonies of Gustav Mahler from Faith and Freedom (1983)***

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## Notes

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2. Albrecht Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung (1870) trans. J. S. Black, A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification (Edinburgh, Edinburgh, 1872).
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4. D.F. Strauss, Leben Jesu (1835) trans. Peter C Hodgson, (London, SCM 1973).
5. The English theologian Bethune Baker, a Ritschlian added: "I know almost nothing of God's character apart from Jesus." Modern Churchman, (September 1921).
6. Baur also denied the Pauline authorship of Romans, Corinthians & Galatians, Epistles which he placed in 2<sup>nd</sup> century, and he claimed that Matthew is the earliest gospel. John he dismissed as of no historical value.
7. Strauss was enormously influential in the progress of historical criticism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. But Nietzsche accused him of making "timid concessions to the taste of the time" and added "You have founded the most agreeable religion in the world: a religion whose Founder is critically honoured by being laughed at".  
F Nietzsche, Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen (1873) trans. R J Hollingdale Untimely Meditations, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983) p.16.
8. D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) Section XII Pt III, L. A. Selby-Bigg, ed.; (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966) p.165.
9. St Thomas Aquinas, 'The Five Ways' Summa Theologiae Part I, trans. Timothy McDermott (London, Methuen 1989) pp 12-14.
10. I. Kant, Der Kritik der Reiner Vernunft (1781). trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason, (New York, St Martins Press, 1933) pp.165-191.
11. There was a strong High Church Movement in England from the time of R. Bancroft (1544-1610) and R. Hooker (1544-1600) but the movement became more radical and politically important after J. Keble's (1792-1866) Assize Sermon of 14<sup>th</sup> July 1833 and ninety Tracts for the Times, 27 of which were written by J. H. Newman. (1801-1890).
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13. J. R. H. Moorman, A History of the Church in England, (London, Black, 1960) p.114.
14. The word “agnostic” coined by T. H. Huxley (1825-1895) in 1869 as a parody of Acts 17:23. The Gnostics claimed to know. Huxley claimed not to know - whether God exists.
15. Arnold wrote of faith’s “... melancholy, long, withdrawing roar” M. Arnold, ‘Dover Beach’ (1855), The Penguin Book of English Verse, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1956).
16. He speaks of “the dust of creeds outworn”. P. B. Shelley, ‘Prometheus Unbound’ (1818-1819) *ibid.*. Shelley was expelled from Oxford for joint authorship of The Necessity of Atheism (1811).
17.        “What ailed us, O gods, to desert you  
              For creeds that refuse and restrain?  
              Come down and relieve us from virtue,  
              Our Lady of Pain”  
      A. C. Swinburne, ‘Dolores’ (1866) Oxford Companion to English Verse, Vol. 3 Oxford, OUP, 1954).
18.        “O May I join the choir invisible  
              Be to some poor soul a cup of strength in their great agony”  
      George Eliot, ‘The Choir Invisible’ (1874).
19. “Nothing at bottom is real except humanity” - “Il n’y a au fond, de réel que l’humanité”  
A. Comte, System de Politique Positive (1851-1854) trans. J. H. Bridges, Comte’s Systematic Positive Philosophy (London, Longmans, 1875-77) p.35
20. But “The Eroica was conceived as a tribute not to the idea of revolution but to the revolutionary hero, Napoleon, and really to Beethoven himself”  
Joseph Kerman & Alan Tyson Beethoven (London, Macmillan, 1983) p.109.
21. of which Berlioz (1803-1869) wrote: “This is no question of gaily dressed shepherds: it is a matter of nature in her simple truth.”  
H. Berlioz, ‘Chants’ (1862) quoted in Harold C. Schonberg, The Lives of the Great Composers (London, Davis-Poynter, 1971) p.145.
22. “By joy, bright spark of divinity all men become brothers ... whoever has created an abiding friendship or has won a true and loving wife.” J C F von Schiller (1759-1805) Ode to Joy. This forms the text for the last movement of the Ninth Symphony trans. Alan Kendall, The Life of Beethoven (London, Hamlyn, 1978) p.116.
23. “Could it be possible! This old saint in the forest has not yet heard of it, that God is dead.”  
F. Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra (1896) trans. R.J. Hollingdale Thus Spake Zarathustra Harmondsworth, (Penguin 1961) p.40.
24. “The geological periods of life present us with a picture of the ever-increasing domination of mind over matter.” C.Lyell, The Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man (London, Murray, 1863) p.49

25. "I have called this principle, by which each slight variable, if useful, is preserved, by the term Natural Selection."

C. Darwin, The Origin of Species Chapter 3, ed. J Murray (London, Murray 1902) p.69.

26. But Darwin did not reject divine authorship of the world: "There is grandeur in this view of life, with its natural powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator."

ibid. Chapter 15, p.297.

27. S. T. Coleridge, Aids To Reflection ed. H N Coleridge (London, William Pickering, 1839).

Thomas Carlyle referred to Coleridge as, "The Kantian (*sic*) metaphysician and quondam Lake poet"

C. R. Sanders and K. J. Fielding, ed; Collected Letters of Thomas and Jane Carlyle (Oxford, OUP, 1970) p.190.

28. "Evidences? I am weary of evidences. Only make a man *feel* his need for religion."

Op.cit. S. T. Coleridge, p.126.

29. "When a tumultuous scientist seeks to invade the sphere of the existential, and there proceeds to confuse the ethical, the life principle of the whole, then he is as scientist no faithful lover, and science itself stands ready to deliver him up to a comic apprehension."

S. Kierkegaard, Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift (1846).

trans, David F Swenson & Walter Lowrie; Concluding Unscientific Postscript, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1968 ed) p.259.

30. "I thought that if Liberalism once got a footing within the Church of England, it was sure of victory in the end. I saw that Reformation principles were powerless to rescue her."

J. H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua (1864) (London, Fontana, 1959 ed) p.83.

31. One man who could not bring himself to believe, but who could not not believe either was Matthew Arnold whose position was satirised by the idealist F H Bradley (1846-1924): "'Is there a God?' asks the reader. 'Oh yes,' replies Mr Arnold 'and I can verify him in experience.' 'And what is he then?' cries the reader. 'Be virtuous and as a rule you will be happy.' 'Well, and God?' 'That is God,' says Mr Arnold.

F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.Oxford, Clarendon Press 1927 ) p.184.

and...

32. ...another was Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) of whom Nietzsche wrote: "At bottom Carlyle is simply an English atheist who makes it a point of honour not to be one."

F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung (1889), trans. R. J. Hollingdale; Twilight of the Idols (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1968) p.104.

33. Prominent among them were F. A. M. Schlick (1882-1936); Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) and Friedrich Waismann (1896-1959).

34. "We reject all philosophical questions, whether of metaphysics, ethics or epistemology" R. Carnap, Aufbau der Welt (1928), in trans. M. Black; The Unity of Science (London, Kegan Paul 1934) p.2.

35. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth & Logic (1936) Chapter 6 (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1959 edition).
36. 'Good' is defined as 'a simple non-natural property' recognised by a direct act of intuition.  
G. E. Moore Ethics (1912) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966 edition) p.9.
37. "In adding that [stealing] is wrong, I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it". Op.cit. A. J. Ayer p.112.  
But we may ask what precisely makes Ayer's disapproval *moral* disapproval?
38. S. Freud, The Future of an Illusion (1927) (London, Hogarth Press, 1928).
39. "At bottom God is nothing other than an exalted father."  
S. Freud, Totem and Taboo (1913), trans, A. A. Brill (Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1940 edition) p.17.
40. B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1953).
41. A. Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine (London, Picador, 1967) p.14.
42. George Eliot, Scenes of Clerical Life (1857) (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972 edition).
43. "How does the philosophical problem about mental states and behaviourism arise? The first step is the one that entirely escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometimes perhaps we shall know more about them - we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter."  
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953), para 308, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1963 ed.).
44. R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1952) and Freedom and Reason (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963).
45. "Freedom of self-direction is necessary for blame. We can only blame conscious things, and these only when the harm they do is intentional."  
J. Wisdom, Problems of Mind and Matter (London, Cambridge University Press, 1963) p.38.
46. Karl Barth, A Shorter Commentary on Romans (London, SCM, 1963 edition) p.60.
47. ...particularly Gore's argument that Catholic principles need not be at odds with biblical criticism. Charles Gore, Lux Mundi (3<sup>rd</sup> ed. London, Murray 1890).
48. ...especially that there could be an evangelical criticism of liberalism that took into account the work of Barth and Spengler: "The plain facts of the world economies spoke to me in a language of philosophy and theology. The teachings of Calvin and Jonathan Edwards about man seemed much less nonsensical in such a situation than the modern doctrines of the romantics, evolutionists and Christian Liberals."  
D. R. Davies, On to Orthodoxy (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1939) p.110.

49. "There is really nothing 'academic', in the pejorative sense, about truth at all. It lies at the base of all sane human intercourse, civilised and uncivilised alike. The capacity to recognise it is what distinguishes man from the beasts. I have described it as the Intellectual Principle."  
E. L. Mascall, Whatever Happened to the Human Mind? (London, SPCK, 1980) p.10.
50. "If accepting the car means accepting Mr Ford's philosophy, it will be far more worthy of a philosopher to say frequently that men never *needed* cars at all. It is only because man had been sent into exile in a railway-train that he has to be brought back in a motor-car."  
G. K. Chesterton, The Free Man and the Ford Car (1916) in G.J. Marlin, ed. G. K. Chesterton Collected Works Vol. 5 (San Francisco, Ignatius Press 1987) p.171.
51. J. A. T. Robinson, Honest to God (London, SCM, 1963).  
This book was reprinted nine times in as many months.
52. He deplored what he saw as the fact that, "In place of God who is literally or physically 'up there', we have accepted as part of our mental furniture a God who is spiritually or metaphysically 'out there'." *ibid.* p.13.
53. J. A. T. Robinson, But That I Can't Believe (London, SCM, 1965).
54. Van Buren applied Anthony Flew's parable of the gardener to the question of the existence of God: "Just how does what you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive God differ from no God at all?"  
Paul Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel, (London, SCM, 1963) p.3.
55. "If there is one clear portal to the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it is a passage through the death of God, the collapse of any meaning or reality lying beyond the newly-discovered radical immanence of modern man - an immanence dissolving even the memory or shadow of transcendence."  
T. J. J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism, (Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1966) p.22.
56. "The theologian of today doesn't really believe in God, whatever that means, or that there is a God, or that God *exists*."  
Hamilton, W., 'Thursday's Child' in Theology Today, Volume XX, No. 2 (January, 1964).
57. This term appears throughout Jung's work, but the most thorough analysis of it is to be found in C. G. Jung, 'The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious', Collected Works, Vol 9, trans. R. F. C. Hull, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959).
58. C. G. Jung, 'Answer to Job', 'Psychology and Religion East and West', Collected Works Vol 11, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).
59. The objective correlative is the image or metaphor which accurately externalises a mental state.  
Eliot, T. S., 'The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism' (1933) in Selected Prose of T S Eliot ed. Frank Kermode, (London, Faber & Faber, 1975) pp 79-97.
60. For Jung "individuation" is the goal of psychological integrity or wholeness. It is a concept central to his work. -

C. G. Jung, 'Mysterium Coniunctionis', Collected Works, Vol. 14, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).

61. C. G. Jung, 'Answer to Job', op. cit.

62. Psalm 111:10.

63. I Samuel 11:7; II Chronicles 19:9; Isaiah 11:2 etc.

64. Genesis 28:17.

65. Exodus 3:5.

66. Exodus 3:14. Often rendered "I will be who I will be."

67. For St Paul, the love of God may cause us to feel pain in its operation. Romans 8:22.

68. "Good may exist on its own but evil cannot."

St Augustine, Civitas Dei, trans. H. Bettenson, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, Book 12, Chapter IX (Penguin, 1972) p.480.

"Nor can there be intrinsic sources of evil. Those who believe in two sources of things, one good and one evil, think there must be particular contrary causes for particular contrary effects, and forget that there must be a universal cause of everything".

St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 49:3, trans. Timothy McDermott, (Methuen 1989) p.94.

The doctrine of evil as *privatio boni* derives from Plato.

69. "'Not', which is so simple to use, is utterly mystifying to think about; no theory of judgement which does not give an account of it can hope to be adequate."

G. E. M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, (London, Hutchinson, 1959) p.61.

70. and: "The falsehood of the elementary proposition never consists in anything but the non-existence of a single atomic fact." *ibid.* p.64.

71. "Man can regard all the evil within himself as a delusion." L. Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen, trans. & ed. Peter Winch, Culture and Value, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1980) p.67.

72. Deuteronomy 30:15.

73. C. G. Jung, op.cit. Collected Works, Vol 9.

74. Simone de Beauvoir expertly articulates the most telling criticism of Jung's depiction of the feminine: "She is defined and differentiated with reference to man, and not he with reference to her. She is incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. *He* is the Subject."

S. de Beauvoir, Le Deuxième Sexe, trans. H. M. Parshley, The Second Sex, (London, Four Square Books, 1960) p.48.

75. A similar criticism of the purely inspirational purpose of women is found in Nietzsche's strictures on Goethe's concept of Das Ewig- Weibliche.  
Op. cit., Nietzsche, 'On Poets', Thus Spake Zarathustra (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1961) pp 91-93

76. The Anima is "Jungfrau, Mütter, Königin, Göttin"; "Young girl, Mother, Queen, Goddess"  
J. W. V. Goethe, Faust, part 2, Act 5, (Leipzig, Im Insel-Verlag, 1797).

77. C. G. Jung, op.cit. Collected Works, Vol 11.

78. The concept of individuation is central to Jung's thought. A sustained discussion of it appears in Jung, op.cit., Volume 9, Part 6.

79. "We experience symbols of the Self which cannot be distinguished from God symbols. I cannot prove that the Self and God are identical, although in practice they appear so."  
C. G. Jung, Letters, Vol 2 translated by R. F. C. Hull (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976) p.265.

80. Psalm 130:1.

81. Particularly Jesus' Farewell Discourses; John 13-17.

82. "A man can hardly know that he knows God when he does not know himself." and "It is true that God becomes man, it is also true that man becomes God."  
R. B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart: A Modern Translation, (New York, Harper & Row, 1941) p.80.

83. St John of the Cross outlines a process of purgation which is similar to that found in Jung's "Individuation Process". For St John of the Cross the soul's destiny is to adhere finally to God "by pure faith." St John of the Cross, The Ascent of Mount Carmel, ed. E. A. Peers (London, Burns and Oates 1983) & The Dark Night of the Soul, (London, Fount 1995).

84. "The name of this infinite depth and ground of all being is God."  
P. Tillich, The Courage to Be, (Yale, The University Press, 1952) p.40.

85. "Jesus our true Mother - he would become our Mother in everything ... This fine and lovely word 'Mother' is so sweet and so much its own that it cannot ever be used properly of any but him."  
Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, Chapter 60, ed. Clifton Walters, (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1960) p.169.

86. St Matthew 4:1.

87. C. G. Jung, op. cit. Collected Works, Vol 9 Chapter 6 'Answer to Job', passim.

88. St Matthew 4:1; St Mark 1:12; St Luke 4:1-2.

89. St Matthew 3:17.

90. C. G. Jung, op. cit., Letters, Volume 1.
91. "This Christ behaves rather like a bad-tempered, power-conscious boss who very much resembles the shadow of a love-preaching bishop."  
C. G. Jung, op. cit., Collected Works, Vol 11 Chapter 6, 'Answer to Job' p.461.
92. "The devil is God's first son, Christ being the second."  
C. G. Jung, op. cit., Collected Works, Volume 11 Chapter 5, p.347.
93. Revelation 20:1.
94. Isaiah 42:1-4; 49:1-6; 50:4-9; 52:13- 53:12.
95. The General Synod of the Church of England has a Board for Social Responsibility which produces reports on social affairs with an alacrity that recalls Eliot's denunciation of men "dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to be good."  
T. S. Eliot, 'Choruses from the Rock' (1934), The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot (London, Faber 1969) p.145.
96. This sort of production, "...is least effective when too obviously amateur or over-ambitious or open to attack as neo-Marxist."  
Adrian Hastings, A History of English Christianity (1920-1985) (London, Collins, 1986) p.654.
97. Particularly Newman's arguments concerning the possibility of divine revelation in a sermon preached in 1841: "Proof need not be the subject of analysis, or take a methodical form, or be complete and symmetrical in the believing mind; and that probability is its life. I do but say that it is antecedent probability that gives meaning to those arguments from facts which are commonly called Evidences of Revelation ..."  
Ian Ker, John Henry Newman (Oxford, Clarendon, 1988) p.201.
98. ... who sought objectivity in religious thought and practice. Eliot says of him, "His emotion is purely contemplative. It is not personal; it is wholly evoked by the object of contemplation, to which it is adequate; his emotions wholly contained in and explained by its object." T. S. Eliot, 'Lancelot Andrewes' (1926) in op.cit. ed. Kermode p.180.
99. The injunction to embrace the Christian faith not for psychological satisfaction but in all its ethical and doctrinal fulness is exemplified by William Law.  
A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life ed. J. C. Reid (Edinburgh, Collins 1965).
100. 'The intellectual achievement and the prose style of Hooker and Andrewes came to complete the structure of the English Church as the philosophy of the 13<sup>th</sup> C crowns the Catholic Church' quoted in F.O.Matthiesen, The Achievement of T.S.Eliot (Oxford, OUP 1947) p.124.
101. ... in a BBC television interview with John Freeman in the series Face to Face, (1960).
102. "Let him have thy cloak also." St Matthew 5:40;  
"Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth" St Matthew 6:19;



“Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat” St Matthew 6:25.

103. “Blessed are the forgetful: for they get the better even of their blunders.”

F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (1885-1886) trans. R.J.Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973) p.83.

104. ... and for example from an early play: “There is strong shadow where there is much

light” J. W. von Goethe, Götz von Berlichingen, Act II, Scene 4:18, (Leipzig, Im Insel-Verlag, 1773).

105. Galatians 3:28.

106. “Beatrice who shall be a light between love and intellect.”

Dante, ‘Purgatorio’, Divina Comedia (1314), VI:1,45 trans. C. H. Sisson (Manchester, Carcanet 1980) p.177.

107. Upon the death of Bice Portinari (his Beatrice) in 1290, Dante promised her, “A poem such as has been composed for no lady before.”

Dante, ‘Vita Nuova’ (1292) quoted in G. Holmes, Dante (Oxford, OUP, 1980) p.4.

108. G von Strassburg, Tristan and Isolde (early 13<sup>th</sup> century). One of the great North European folk legends. The love-death motif received, as it were, its apotheosis in Wagner’s opera (1865) and its notoriety in Freud’s Eros-Thanatos syzygy in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) (New York, Liveright Publishing, 1922).

109. F. Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (1880), trans. Constance Garnett (London, Everyman 1927).

110. F. Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment (1866) trans. David McDuff (Harmondsworth, Viking 1991).

111. “For the first time, the first, I laid my heart open to the benign indifference of the universe ... the Absurd is the essential concept which makes hope unnecessary”.

A. Camus, Le Mythe de Sisyphe (1942), trans. Philip Thody, The Myth of Sisyphus (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1961) p.36. Camus does not mean us to abandon hope and so despair, but to understand and accept the world as absurd. The world is not going to change. It is always absurd. Camus sees a sort of comfort in this.

112. “It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.”

L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1921) para. 6.44, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961).

113. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), (London, Fontana 1960), Chapters 4 & 5. pp 92-137

114. Jung warns against “pushing the process of Individuation” as “exactly the thing you cannot do because it instantly leads into an inflation [hubris]”

C. G. Jung, op. cit. Letters Volume 2, p.267.

115. "He heard in the room a voice which was distinctly, it seemed, not his own, saying, 'So here it is at last, the distinguished thing!'" Last words of Henry James, reported in Edith Wharton, 'A Backward Glance' (1934) Quoted in ed. D. J. Enright, The Oxford Book of Death (Oxford, OUP, 1983) p.329.
116. C. H. Sisson, English Poetry 1990 - 1950 (Manchester, Carcanet, 1971) p.196.
117. "When you steal from one author, it's plagiarism; when you steal from many, it's research". Anon. (Music-Hall joke).
118. "Some forms of ill health, debility or anaemia may produce an efflux of poetry in a way approaching the condition of automatic writing. These moments are characterised by the sudden lifting of the burden of anxiety and fear which pressed upon our daily life ..."  
T. S. Eliot, op. cit. The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (1933) p.80.
119. "Darkling, I listen; and, for many a time  
I have been half in love with easeful Death"  
John Keats, Ode to a Nightingale (1819) Stanza 6 .
120. Acts 13:8-11.
121. T. S. Eliot, 'The Dry Salvages' (1941), op. cit. Complete Poems.
122. "There are indeed things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical"  
L. Wittgenstein, op. cit. Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, para. 6.522 .
123. 2 Corinthians 3:6.
124. T. S. Eliot, op. cit. 'The Dry Salvages'.
125. C. H. Sisson, op cit. English Poetry 1900-1950 p.145.
126. E. Pound, ABC of Reading (London, Faber 1934) p.127.
127. D. Davie, Articulate Energy (London, Methuen 1955) p.2.
128. C. H. Sisson, op cit. English Poetry 1900-1950 p.40.
129. "... to construct the complete mechanism of a steam engine without having any idea that, or how, it could be used to drive anything."  
L. Wittgenstein, op. cit. Culture and Value p.45.
130. D H Lawrence quoted in ed. D. Anderson & P. Mullen, Faking It (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1998) p.121.
131. T. S. Eliot, 'Little Gidding' (1942), op.cit. Complete Poems.
132. The Burial of the Dead, Book of Common Prayer (1662)

133. Psalm 90:10.

134. Romans 7:19

135. The General Confession, Book of Common Prayer (1662).

136. A. Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena (1851) trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Essays and Aphorisms (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1970) p.112.

137. Psalm 104:15.

138. Proverbs 30:18-19.

139. The Burial of the Dead, Book of Common Prayer (1662).

140. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, (c1600), Act I Scene 2.

141. William Shakespeare, Macbeth (c1605) Act V Scene 5.

142. Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (1949), (Harmondsworth, Pelican 1962 edition) p.18.

143. Psalm 22:1.

144. But cf. Sigmund Freud for a classic example of his inversion of religious contexts whereby man is not made in the image of God, but God in the image of man - particularly of man's father.

S. Freud, Moses and Monotheism (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1939).

145. The General Confession, Book of Common Prayer (1662).

146. S. Freud, op.cit. Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

147. T. S. Eliot, op.cit. 'Choruses from the Rock'.

148. Simone Weil, Attente de Dieu, (1950), trans D. Raper, Waiting for God (London, Collins, 1951) p.19.

149. Otto's idea of "the numinous" borrows heavily on the work of an earlier German theologian: "Have you not often felt this holy longing as something unknown? Become conscious of the call of your deepest nature and follow it"

F. D. R. Schleiermacher, 'On Religion', Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (1799) trans .John Oman (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1958) p.16.

150. T. Stoppard, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead (London, Faber, 1967) p.15.

151. "A world that can be explained even with bad reasons is a familiar world. But in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This divorce between a man and his life, the actor and his setting, is probably the feeling

of absurdity” A. Camus, op.cit. The Myth of Sisyphus p.209.

152. “only Being-free *for* death gives Dasein its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one’s existence it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities and brings Dasein into the simplicity of its *fate*. This is how we designate Dasein’s primordial historicising, which lies in authentic resoluteness ...”

M. Heidegger, Sein and Zeit (1927) trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London, SCM 1961) p.261.

153. “I am beginning to warm up again, to feel happy. This is nothing out of the ordinary as yet, just a little Nausea happiness; it spreads out at the bottom of the shiny puddle, at the bottom of *our* time. It’s no sooner born than it’s already old. It seems as if I had known it for twenty years.”

J. P. Sartre, La Nausée (1938), trans. Robert Baldick, Nausea (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1965) p.43.

154. St John 11:4.

155. ... and even upon the indescribability of there being a God: “It’s a strange thing, I don’t like men and I don’t like animals. As for God, he is beginning to disgust me.”

S. Beckett, ‘Molloy’ (1950) in The Beckett Trilogy (London, John Calder 1959) p.33.

156. Psalm 10:1.

157. Psalm 22:1.

158. “It is unfortunate for Existentialists that God does not happen to exist.”

Jean Paul Sartre, quoted in the journal Les Temps Modernes ( September, 1947).

159. “I could not have gone through the awful wretched mess of life without having left a stain upon the silence.” Deirdre Bair, Samuel Beckett (London, Collins 1978) p.469.

160. “O dark, dark, dark. They all go into the dark.

The vacant interstellar spaces, the vacant into the vacant.”

T. S. Eliot, ‘East Coker’ (1940), op.cit. Collected Poems .

161. Psalm 23:4

162. “Thy loving-kindness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life: And I will dwell in the house of the Lord forever.” Psalm 23:6.

163. A. M. Werfel, Gustav Mahler: Erinnerungen und Briefe (1940), trans and ed. Donald Mitchell and Knud Martner, Alma Mahler: Memories and Letters (London, Cardinal 1990) p.67.

164. cf. Appendix.

165. Das Klagende Lied (1880)  
Kindertotenlieder (1901)

Das Lied von der Erde (1908)

166. One thinks of the tragic use of the key of G-minor in the String Quintet K.516 and the Symphony K.550 and in Pamina's despairing aria 'Ach, Ich Fühl's' in Die Zauberflöte K.620

167. E. Wharton, op.cit.

168. T. S. Eliot, 'Ash Wednesday' (1930), op.cit. Collected Poems.

169. "The point of intersection of the timeless  
With time, is an occupation for the saint."

T. S. Eliot, 'The Dry Salvages' (1941), op.cit. Collected Poems.

170. The theme runs throughout Jung's work, but is developed in detail in his posthumously published autobiography, C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams and Reflections (London, Fontana 1962).

171. G. K. Chesterton, 'The Rolling English Road', in P. J. Kavanagh ed. The Essential G. K. Chesterton (Oxford, OUP, 1987) pp.352-353.

172. John Donne, 'Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions', Number 17 (1624) in Complete Poetry and Selected Prose ed. John Hayward (New York, Nonesuch 1929).

173. Invitation to Confession from the Book of Common Prayer (1662).

174. I Corinthians 15:56.

175. I Peter 4:8.

176. "A little ship, with oars and food  
and little dishes, and all accoutrements  
fitting and ready for the departing soul."  
D. H. Lawrence, The Ship of Death (1925)

177. St Francis of Assisi, Canticle of the Sun, in Hymns Ancient & Modern (Revised) (William Clowes 1949).

178. This novel includes many brilliant sentences, among them the question "What did your loved one pass on from?"

E. Waugh, The Loved One (1947), (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1961 edition) p.83.

179. Huxley has children going to their "thanatos lessons" in a brilliant satire on, *inter alia*, Freud's later theory, cf. note 107 above.

A. Huxley, Brave New World (1932), (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1963 edition).

180. John 11:39 Whereas The King James Bible comes straight out with it: "He stinketh", the Revised Standard Version (London, Nelson, 1946) has, "There will be an odour"; Luther is pleasingly basic, "Herr, er stinkt schon" (1522).

181. The Alternative Service Book (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980) omits all the Book of Common Prayer (1662) references to “vile bodies”, “worms” etc.
182. Judges 9:53-55; II Samuel 17:23; I Kings 16:15-20; I Chronicles 10:3-13; Matthew 27:5. The Sixth Commandment may also apply to suicide, Exodus 20:13.
183. Plato indicates that suicide is a shameful act by the decree that the corpses of those who do away with themselves should be buried after dusk.  
Plato, Laws 9:873: Plato's Laws B. F. Stalley (Oxford, Blackwell 1983).
184. Lactantius, ‘Divine Institutes’ 3:18 in J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (London, A&C Black 1958).
185. “Anyone who kills himself is a murderer.” St Augustine, op.cit. P.385
186. First Council of Braga, ‘Canon 16’ (AD 561)
187. Catechism of the Catholic Church (London, Cassell 1992)
188. ... he himself might his quietus make/with a bare bodkin?  
W. Shakespeare, op.cit., Hamlet (c1600) III. 1:56.
189. ibid.
190. ibid. III.1:89
191. ibid. II.2:316
192. “Anomie, therefore is a regular and specific factor in suicide in our modern societies; one of the springs from which the annual contingent springs. So we have here a new type of suicide to distinguish from the others. It differs from them in its dependence, not on the way in which individuals are attached to society, but on how it regulates them.”  
E. Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (1912), trans. J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952 ) p.184.
193. A. Alvarez, The Savage God (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1974) p.64.
194. Voltaire, Dictionaire Philosophique (1764), trans. Theodore Besterman (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1971).
195. F. Nietzsche, op.cit., Beyond Good and Evil; maxim no.157, p.85.
196. F. Dostoevsky, The Possessed (1871), trans. Constance Garnett (London, Dent 1925) p.380.
197. A. Schopenhauer, ‘On Suicide’ op.cit., Parega and Paralipomena pp. 77-79.
198. A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819) Book 3, chapter 69 trans. E. F. J. Payne The World as Will and Representation (New York, The Falcon's Wing Press, 1958) p.398.

199. Vernon Scannell, 'Felo de Se' in New Poems 1973-74 Stewart Conn ed, (London, Hutchinson 1974) p63.
200. J. Donne, 'Death Be Not Proud' in A.J.Smith ed, The Complete English Poems (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1982 edition) cf. W. Shakespeare,  
"O Proud Death, what feast is  
Toward in thine eternal cell?" op.cit., Hamlet V:ii:378.
201. G. Mahler, op.cit., Das Lied von der Erde (1908).
202. A. Schopenhauer, op.cit. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Book 3, chapter 52 p.257.
203. Plato, op.cit. Laws.
204. Beethoven, 'Letter to Goethe' (1810) , quoted in op.cit. ed.Kerman and Tyson p.53.
205. L. Wittgenstein, op.cit. ed. Winch p.36.
206. cf. Note 121, above.
207. J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, ed. G.J. Warnock (Oxford, OUP 1962) .
208. L. Wittgenstein, op.cit. ed. Winch p.83.
209. A. C. Swinburne, The Garden of Proserpine .
210. Ian Ramsey, Religious Language (London, SCM 1959) p.17.
211. J. Enoch Powell, Reflections of a Statesman (London, Bellew Publishing 1991) p.167.
212. St Mark 4:5.
213. 'General Confession', Book of Common Prayer (1662).
214. 'The Burial of the Dead', Book of Common Prayer (1662).
215. *ibid*.
216. *ibid*.
217. "Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing?, then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then evil?"  
D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, (1779), Book 10 (London, Fontana 1964 edition) p.121.
218. "So it may be said that if this were not the best of all possible worlds, God would not have created any."  
G. Leibnitz, 'Theodicy' Book I:8 (1710) in Leibnitz: Selections in English ed. and trans. D. Garber and R. Ariew (London, Hackett, 1991) p.160.

219. A. Schopenhauer, op.cit. Parerga and Paralipomena p.42.
220. T. Carlyle, Sartor Resartus (1833), (New York, Harrap 1933 edition) p.16.
221. H. G. Wells, The Time Machine (1895), (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1962 edition).
222. I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) trans. T. K. Abbott 10<sup>th</sup> Ed.(London, Longmans Green 1949) p.200.
223. Psalm 56:8.
224. Psalm 103:13.
225. John 3:16.
226. Romans 8:22.
227. Psalm 46:10.
228. But see Schleiermacher, before Otto: "We also have strange dread, mysterious emotions, when the imagination reminds us that there is more in nature than we know."  
F. D. R. Schleiermacher, op.cit. trans. John Oman p.43.
229. W. Wordsworth, 'The Prelude' (1805).
230. T. S. Eliot, 'The Waste Land' (1922), op.cit. Collected Poems.
231. G. M. Hopkins, 'The Starlight Night'.
232. cf. Note 65, above.
233. S. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1932), (New York, W.W. Norton & Co Inc., 1933).
234. W. Cowper, 'O For a Closer Walk with God'; The Olney Hymns (1779) in op. cit. Hymns Ancient and Modern (Revised)
235. B. Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (London, Unwin Books 1975 edition) p.330.
236. St. Ignatius Loyola, Spiritual Exercises (1541) (London, Cassell 1981).
237. J. P. de Caussade, L'Abandon à la Providence Divine (1867) trans. K. Muggeridge, The Sacrament of the Present Moment (London, Fount 1966).
238. cf. Note 124.
239. G. Herbert, 'Teach Me My God and King' op.cit., (Ancient & Modern Revised).



240. B. Pascal, Pensées, trans. Ernest Rhys, with an Introduction by T. S. Eliot, (London, J. M. Dent 1931) p.146.
241. Quoted in J. Norris ed. Prayers of the Fathers (London, Cassell 1966) p.32.
242. Council of Chalcedon A.D. 451. Extracts of this Council in J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (London, A&C Black 1958).
243. St. Thomas Aquinas, op.cit., Summa Theologiae Volume 48 pp. 471-504.
244. Duns Scotus, De Primo Principio trans. A. B. Wolter (New York, Harvard, 1949). (Franciscan Herald Press 1966) p. 268.
245. M. Luther, 'Table Talk' (1542); in Luther the Expositor by J. Pelikan (New York, Concordia, 1959).
246. E. Renan, Vie de Jesus (1863), Ernest Rhys trans., Life of Jesus (London, J. M. Dent 1927).
247. A. Harnack, Das Wesen des Christentums (1900), trans. T. B. Saunders (New York, Harper & Row 1957).
248. B. H. Streeter, 'The Historic Christ', Foundations (London, Murray 1912).
249. A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1929) p.139.
250. P. Teilhard de Chardin, Le Phenomene Humain (1955) trans. Bernard Wall, The Phenomenon of Man (London, Collins, 1957); Le Milieu Divin (1957), trans. Bernard Wall, Le Milieu Divin (London, Collins, 1960).
251. Op.cit. Altizer (1966) p.109.
252. R. Bultmann, 'The Case for Demythologising' (1953) in Kerygma & Myth Volume II trans. R. H. Fuller, (London, SPCK, 1962) p.180.
253. e.g. Daniel 12:2.
254. Isaiah 26:19.
255. "The Isaiah passage is unique in the prophetic literature."  
J. Lindblom, Prophecy in Ancient Israel (Oxford, Blackwell 1962) p.414.
256. "Unlike the Greek doctrine of the immortality of the soul, it is infused with the Israelite sense of history."  
B. W. Anderson, The Living World of the Old Testament (London, Longmans 1958) p.506.
257. "This belief was undoubtedly necessary if the divine justice was to be harmonised with the brutal facts of experience." John Bright, A History of Israel (London, SCM 1960) p. 291.

258. I Corinthians 15:20.
259. I Corinthians 15:17.
260. "The purpose of demythologising is not to make religion more acceptable to modern man by trimming the original biblical texts, but to make clearer to modern man what the Christian faith is. He must be confronted with the issue of decision."  
Op.cit. Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth Vol II, p.180.
261. "The meaning of Christ's event, as a thing of the past, doesn't depend on my decision. My decision means that I hear and open myself to the claim which is latent in this event."  
'Bultmann in conversation with Bornkamm'. ibid. Ed. Bartsch, 'The Present State of the Debate' p.45.
262. "What must the truth have been and be if it appeared like that to men who thought and wrote as they did? L. Hodgson, quoted in D. E. Nineham, St Mark (Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1963) p.52.
263. "Men would have laughed Christ's physical resurrection out of court, had not the possibility and actuality of these events been demonstrated by the divine power of truth, or rather by the truth of the divine power, with confirmation by miraculous signs."  
op.cit., St Augustine, XXII: 7 p.1033.
264. "If the choice is made tentatively we call it opinion, but if with certainty and without doubt we call it faith." op.cit., St Thomas Aquinas, 10:1 p.329.
265. op.cit. Luther, section 53.
266. "I have therefore found it necessary to destroy knowledge in order to make room for faith."  
I. Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (1781), trans. N Kemp Smith, Critique of Pure Reason (New York, St Martin's Press, 1933) p.179.
267. "Without risk there is no faith. Faith is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness, and the objective uncertainty."  
Op.cit. Kierkegaard p.64.
268. J. H. Newman, 'On the Certainty of Faith', (1848) quoted in op cit Ian Ker p.459.
269. op cit. John Henry Newman (1988) Ian Ker p.451.
270. B. J. F. Lonergan, Insight (London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1958) p.9.
271. T. S. Eliot, 'Little Gidding' in op.cit. Collected Poems.
272. Exodus 22:21; Leviticus 19:10 etc.
273. St Matthew 8:10.

274. E. Pound, Cantos, Number 86 (London, Faber, 1988 edition) p.579.
275. P. Mullen, Church Times (12.7.1991).
276. J. Hick, The Myth of God Incarnate (London, SCM, 1976).
277. "Christianity is not a doctrine, not I mean a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes place in human life." L. Wittgenstein, op.cit. trans. Winch, Culture and Value p.28.
278. Including the warning, "We are lowering our standards, and more and more abandoning the study of those subjects by which the essentials of our culture are transmitted."  
T. S. Eliot, Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (San Diego, Harcourt Brace, 1976 edition) p.83.
279. S. Weil, Gateway to God ed. David Raper, (London, Collins, 1974) p.86.
280. "It is as dangerous to change one's religion as it is to change one's language."  
cf. Note 148.
281. O. Spengler, Untergang des Abendlandes (1918), trans. C. F. Atkinson, The Decline of the West (London, Allen and Unwin 1961) p.149.
282. cf. Note 23.
283. Exodus 4:29.
284. Norman Malcolm, 'Anselm's Ontological Arguments', J. Hick and A. McGill ed, The Many Faced Argument (London, Macmillan, 1968) pp. 301-320.
285. J. McCabe, The Existence of God (London, Watts & Co., 1933) p.16.
286. E. Pound, op.cit. Cantos, Canto 81, p.535.
287. Isaiah 40:4
288. Genesis 3:8.
289. I Corinthians 11:24.
290. T. S. Eliot, 'The Journey of the Magi' (1927), in op.cit. Collected Poems.
291. F. R. Leavis, English Literature in Our Time and the University (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969) p.23.
292. John 1:14.
293. D. H. Lawrence, 'On John Galsworthy in Selected Literary Criticism' (1956), A. Beal ed., D. H. Lawrence: Selected Literary Criticism (London, Heinemann, 1978 edition) p.101.